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1.	  Introduction	  
Since 2002, Japan has concluded a number of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with coun-
tries mainly in Southeast Asia. Tradable categories in the EPAs have been expanded to include a 
clause of the movement of natural persons, i. e migration of labor to Japan. In 2006 the Philippines 
as a start, Japan made the EPAs including the clause with Indonesia and Vietnam in 2007 and 2009 
respectively, and the signed countries have sent their care workers to Japan. This acceptance of care 
workers under the EPA is a major development in Japan’s migration policies, which does not allow 
low-skilled labors in a long-term base. The EPA migration scheme guarantees a six-year long work 
and resident permit to EPA care workers when they obtain Japan’s National Nursing License during 
their three or four-year training period. It is interesting that Japan, which is a well-known country 
for restrictive migration policies, voluntarily induced the clause and opens the front door for interna-
tional migration. It is a wonder what made the Japanese government open the front door, and 
whether the EPA migration is an authentic change differing itself from Japan’s preceding restrictive 
migration policies. It is interesting to imagine the futuristic impacts of the including the clause into 
the WTO norms through comparing between the EPA migration scheme and other migration poli-
cies in Japan. 
1.1	  Globalization	  and	  Migration	  
Migration has been a feature of human existence for a long time. People move from a place to an-
other for many reasons, but mostly to survive and hopes of becoming better off. Sometimes people 
are forced to move due to wars, natural disasters, and different religious and political reasons. For 
the last couple of centuries, its scale has been unprecedentedly expanding not only in quantitative 
terms but also in types of migration. Especially during the 20th-21st centuries, the volume and types 
of migration have enormously developed and diversified through a multitude of historical relation-
ships, demographic changes, as well as political, socio-economic, geographical and cultural factors.1 
Aside from the question whether ever before nation-states were successful in controlling the migra-
tory flow,2 the expanding international migration is becoming an important concern for politicians 
                                                
1 Stephan Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Agey of Migration (The Third Edition), Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 
specifically in Chapter 4, 6, and 7 of their book. 
2 James F. Hollifield, The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the State Back In"?, 2000, p.155. 
 
 
3 
of host societies because they believe that a sudden massive influx of ‘foreigners’ might cause so-
cial insecurity and instability.3 
On one hand, globalization stimulates international migration and undermines national cultures and 
identities in host countries.4 On the other hand, globalization changes core industries in the devel-
oped world to require more so-called ‘high-skilled’ workers with skills such as engineering, infor-
mation technology, financial knowledge, or multi-linguality. Therefore, nation-states are eager to 
attract ‘good migrants’, and simultaneously tighten regulations against ‘bad migrants’, who might 
be unskilled and undocumented. Another feature of globalization is the increase of non-
governmental and international actors and their increasing influences on nation-states. Global gov-
ernance - i. e. regulating the behavior of states and other transnational actors through norms, rules, 
principles and decision-making procedures,5 such as global human right norms and International 
Labour Organization (ILO) - has influences on governments’ migration policies. For instance, con-
tinuous pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations, as 
well as considerations of Japan’s international image made the Japanese government sign on to 
standard international human rights agreements.6 The political space of nation-states, which is con-
ventionally bound by their own territoriality, has been permeated by the interventions of non- and 
supra-national actors. Nation-states are, however, still active and important actors in shaping global 
governance, for instance through World Trade Organization (WTO) norms. Furthermore, state sov-
ereignty has been expanded through regional cooperation such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). A feature of such regional integration as well as increasing bilateral agreements such as 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and EPAs is that they open the possibility to include the clause of 
movement of natural persons in the negotiations. 
Globalization, in short, is a challenge to state sovereignty, but at the same time a chance to expand 
states’ influence in international politics. International migration, in a similar vein, is a challenge to 
“national identity” and “homogeneous culture”, while also being crucial for developed countries to 
                                                
3 Castles and Miller 2003, p.278. 
4 Jonathon W. Moses, International Migration: Globalization’s Last Frontier, Zed books, 2006, p.176. 
5 Alexander Betts, “The migration industry in global governance.” In The Migration Industry and the Commercializa-
tion of International Migration, eds. Nina Nyberg Sørensen and Thomas Gammeltof-Hansen (Routledge, 2013), p.46. 
6 Kristin Surak, “Convergence in Foreigners’ Right and Citizenship Policies? A Look at Japan,” International Migration 
Review, Vol. 42. Issue 3. (2008), p.559. 
 
 
4 
vitalize their economies through accepting ‘good migrants’. Migration can also be useful in negotia-
tions of bilateral agreements as a bargaining chip. 
Nevertheless, considering the arbitrary features globalization and international migration have, it is 
paradoxical that the two conflicting aspects can coexist in migration policies. As high-skilled work-
ers are required for a certain type of industries, there are also needs for less-skilled workers in other 
industries, which cannot be outsourced or filled with domestic labor. For emerging immigration 
countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan as well as the Gulf states,7 it is a crucial task to fill 
the sectors requiring the two different types of workers without repeating the ‘failure’ of temporary 
recruitment programs in Western European countries in the 1970s, which resulted in the permanent 
stay of many of the foreign workers after the closure of the programs. The motivation for this study, 
therefore, derives from the curiosity to know how the emerging countries try to attract high-skilled 
migrants as well as accept semi/less-skilled workers through measures that governments are still 
able to control. 
1.2	  Accepting	  Foreigners	  for	  Japan’s	  kokusaika	  
Unlike other emerging migration countries, Japan has belonged to the group of developed countries 
for a long time and has passed through periods of rapid economic growth which changed her eco-
nomic structure to that of a knowledge-based economy. Japan’s birth rate is low and her society is 
aging rapidly as is the case in other developed countries. In the decades following the Second World 
War, Japan has mainly managed to grow without relying on foreign labor. This stands in stark con-
trast to as other developed countries which hired foreign workers through bilateral recruitment 
agreements, as for example the USA in her employment of Mexican workers from 1942 to 1964 or 
Germany in her Gastarbeiter8 system during the 1950s to 1970s. Japan, however, rather chose to 
                                                
7 Castles and Miller 2003, p.154; Wayne A. Cornelius, “Japan: The Illusion of Immigration Control” In Controlling 
Immigration: A Global Perspective, eds. Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield (Stanford 
University, 1994); Hollifield et al. 1994, p.9; David Chiavacci, “Japan in the “Global War for Talent”: Chaning 
Concepts of Valuable Foreign Workers and Their Consequences,” Asien: The German Journal on Contemporary Asia 
124 (2012), p. 29. 
8 Gastarbeiter refers to foreign workers who were hired through bilateral recruitment agreements. 
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maximize her domestic labor forces during the 1960s and 1970s by mobilizing women and the el-
derly, as well as automatizing and outsourcing production.9 
Except for comparatively loose regulations for skilled-migrants, there exists no official migration 
policy in Japan to attract less-skilled or unskilled migrants. For the last decades, the Japanese gov-
ernment has been pursuing three tenets of migration policies: no unskilled migrants, no migrants on 
a permanent basis, and migrants as a last resort.10 The low number of foreigners in Japan today, who 
account for less than two percent of the total population in 2010,11 does not give any strong impres-
sion that Japan is an emerging migration country, especially when compared to the high proportion 
of migrants in other OECD countries.12 For instance, almost 20 percent of the German population 
have a “background in migration”, i. e. they are either migrants themselves or their parents are of 
foreign origin. 13 In a long-term perspective, however, the foreign population in Japan has increased 
by a factor of three to four since 1950s. This is an impressive increase, in particular when looking at 
the recent change in the majority migrant group in Japan. Zainichi Koreans14, who had come or 
were forced to come to Japan during the Japanese occupation of Korea 1910-1945, had long consti-
tuted the majority of foreigners in Japan. Since the 1980s, the number of zainichi Koreans has 
shrunk in relative and also in absolute terms,15 and recently the Chinese became the biggest group of 
foreigners in Japan.16 What is also apparent is that the foreign population in Japan has become more 
diverse since the 1980s. (See Figure 1) 
                                                
9 Surak 2008, p.563. 
10 Cornelius 1994, p.386-387; Chiavacci 2012. 
11 In 2010, it is estimated there is over two million foreign population living in Japan. Annual Report of Statistics on 
Legal Migratns, the Ministry of Justice, 2010. Table 10.1 Registered Foreigners by Nationality: 1950-2010. 
12 In 2004, an average of foreign population in OECD was 6.8 percent. OECD FACTBOOK 2007, p.253. 
13 ‘For the first time more than 16 million people with migration background in Germany’, (Access Date: 27.03.2013) 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Press release 248. 714, 2010. 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2010/07/PE10_248_122.html. 
‘Ein Fünftel der Bevölkerung in Deutschland hatte 2010 einen Migrationshintergrund‘ (Access Date: 27.03.2013). 
Statisches Bundesamt, Pressemiteilung Nr. 355, 2011. 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2010/07/PE10_248_122.html. 
14 The term zainichi 在日 literally translates as “staying in Japan” and is used for inhabitants of Japan of foreign nation-
ality. That the term is often used to designate ethnic Koreans in Japan without even including the signifier “Korean” is 
indicative of the fact that the overwhelming majority of foreigners in Japan were for a long time Koreans. 
15 The gradual decrease of zainichi Koreans is due to naturalization (changing to the Japanese nationality) of the second 
and the third generation of zainichi Koreans whose one of parents is a Japanese. Cornelius 1994, p.381.  
16 Population Statistics of Japan 2012, Table 10-1 (人口統計資料集(2012) 表１０－１), Registered Foreigners by Na-
tionality: 1950-2010 (国籍別登録外国人人口：1950～2010 年), National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research (国立社会保障人口問題研究所). Research National Institute of Population and Social Security, Population 
Statistics of Japan 2012. 
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Figure	  1.	  Foreigners	  in	  Japan	  Source:	  National	   Institute	   of	   Population	   and	   Social	   Security	  Research,	   ‘Population	   Statistics	   of	   Japan	  2012’:	  Population	  by	  Nationality	  and	  International	  Migration,	  Table	  10-­‐1.	  Registered	  Foreigners	  by	  Na-­‐tionality:	  1950-­‐2010. 
 
The number of skilled migrants, however, who have entered Japan since the 1980s has remained 
relatively small, 17 while the majority of immigrants are persons with student, traineeship, and enter-
tainer18 visas. 19 Given Japan’s low birth rate and aging societal structure, additional labor is needed 
                                                
17 In 2008, only eight percent of foreigners is classified as skilled labor. 
 David Chiavacci, Japans neue Immigrationspolitik, (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), p.173-174. 
18 According to Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Article 2-2 (Status of Residence and Period of 
Stay)’, Appended Table 2, entertainers are defined to who engage in theatrical performances, musical performances, 
sports or any other form of show business. For instance, Filipino boxers who played in Japan until the 1970s came under 
the entertainer visa. Since the 1970s, Filipinas have entered Japan under the visa to work as dancers, singers and music 
players in night clubs and bars. These women are mostly recognized as ‘sex workers,’ although some of them work as 
bar hostesses. However, their working time and place – late night and bars – shapes negative images, mingled with night, 
alcohol, sex and money, on the entertainer visa.  
Nobue Suzuki, “Filipino Migrations to Japan: From Surrogate Americans to Feminized Workers,” Senri Ethnological 
Reports 77 (2008). 
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7 
in the manufacturing, construction and service sectors, and this need has to be solved through labor 
sources from abroad such as nikkeijin,20 foreign trainees, and students. The foreign trainees and stu-
dents have come to Japan under the project of Japan’s “internationalization” (kokusaika). In 1983, 
the Japanese government announced a plan for “100,000 foreign students by the 21st century.”21  
As part of Japan’s kokusaika, the Japanese government lifted a sanction on foreign students to work, 
so that from January 1984, language students were allowed to work for up to 20 hours per week.22 
Also as part of the project, the Japanese government introduced the Technical Internship Training 
Program in 1993. The trainee program was a reform of the preceding trainee program which had 
existed since 1950s as part of government’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Southeast 
Asia countries. Through the training program, trainees mostly from countries in Southeast Asia 
come to Japan learn advanced technologies for one year and practice the technologies in a two-year 
long internship.23 The project’s stated overall aim is to attract more foreigners – but not migrant 
workers – into Japan and to increase Japan’s ‘international contribution’ by helping developing 
countries through technology transfers. This internal and external effort has succeeded in increasing 
the number of foreign students and trainees in Japan, who have become an unofficial but important 
part of Japan’s labor force. This “side-door” mechanism is one way how Japan could sustain its clo-
sure to migration, i. e. not to open her front door to migrant workers through bilateral recruitment 
agreements.  
If Japans’ kokusaika leads to the arrival of more foreigners in Japan, does it consequently compro-
mise Japan’s three tenets of migration policies as well as Japan’s ‘national identity’? When talking 
                                                                                                                                                            
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Law number: Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951/ Amendment: Act No. 
79 of 2009). 
19 Basic Plan for Immigration Control (The 4th Edition) 2010. p.6. 
Zairyu gaikokujin tokei (Statistics on registered foreigners) 2011, Ministry of Justice, 2012, (Access Date: 27.7.2013). 
http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001111183. 
2011 Immigration Control, Immigration Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Justice, p.5. 
20 Nikkeijin refers to people of Japanese descent who moved to Latin America in the early 20th century. 
Keiko Yamanaka, “Japan as a Country of Immigration: Two Decades after an Influx of Immigrant Workers”, Senri 
Ethnological Reports 77, 2008. p.188. 
The Association of Nikkei & Japanese Abroad (Access Date: 30.05.2013). 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2010/07/PE10_248_122.html. 
21 “21seiki shotoniha, yaku jyu manninno ukeirewo medoniuru. (21 世紀初頭には、約十万人の受け入れをめどにす
る)” In Ryugakusei ukeire 10manninwo mezasu (aim to accept 100,000 foreign students), Yomiuri Shimbun, September 
1, 1983. 
22 Hiroshi Tanaka, 1995, Zainichi gaikokujin; ho no kabe, kokoro no mizo, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, p.188. 
23 Technical Intern Training Guidebook for Technical Intern Trainees, JITCO,  2010. p.2. 
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about the three tenets Japanese politicians often persist on the self-hypnosis that “Japan is not a 
country of immigration” and stress the homogeneity of Japanese society.24 In this thinking, migrant 
workers, who might possibly become permanent residents, seem like a threat to Japan’s “cultural 
homogeneity” and “common values”. This awareness is found in Japanese politicians who like to 
remind the public that the Gastarbeiter system in Germany25 could not guarantee the temporary stay 
of migrant workers but caused permanent migration which increased Germany’s economic burden 
and threatened her cultural identity.26 
It is ironic for Japan, therefore, to persist on the principles, while at the same time promoting Ja-
pan’s kokusaika. In this study I would like to explore in what ways Japan’s kokusaika and migration 
have coexisted in Japan’s migration policies. 
1.3	  Different	  Impacts	  of	  Migration	  and	  Japan’s	  Kokusaika	  
As part of the kokusaika project, Japan has since 2002 aggressively pursued the conclusion of EPAs 
to facilitate the circulation of goods, services and persons between the signatory countries. In 2006 
and 2007, the Japanese government signed bilateral recruitment agreements with the Philippines and 
Indonesia as part of the EPAs to allow care workers of the respective countries to work in Japan. 
According to the Japanese government, the inclusion of the clause of movement of natural persons 
is inevitable to solve trade imbalances between the signatory countries. The inclusion is based on a 
comprehensive interpretation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4 on 
Services:27 “The movement of natural persons is one of the four ways through which services can be 
supplied internationally. It covers natural persons who are either service suppliers (such as inde-
pendent professionals) or who work for a service supplier and who are present in another WTO 
member to supply a service.”28 Human resources are included as part of export and import and 
seemingly not as a solution for the shortage of nurses in Japan, although expectations are expressed 
                                                
24 Harumi Befu, “Nationalism and Nihonjinron.” In Cultrual Nationalism in East Asia by Harumi Befu, University of 
California, 1993, p.114. 
25 Shugiin houmuiinkai (Commission of Judicial Affairs in the House of Councilors) on 5 December 1989. Tanaka 1995, 
p.216.  
26 Shimada, Haruno. Japan's "Guest Workers". (University of Tokyo Press, 1994). 
27 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements - WTO, FTA/EPA, BIT, Ministry of Econ-
omy, Trade and Industry, 2010. 
28 Services: Sector by Sector > Movement of natural persons. WTO (Access Date: 20.07.2013). 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mouvement_persons_e/mouvement_persons_e.htm. 
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that the foreign care workers will positively contribute to the internationalization of Japan’s care fa-
cilities as well as mitigate expected shortage of care workers in the further future.29 
Because of pressure from other countries to include the clause in the EPA,30 Japan partly relaxed her 
three principles - no unskilled migrants, no migrants on a permanent base, and migrants as a last re-
sort – by opening up a possibility for the nurse and care-workers to stay and work in Japan after the 
expiration of their first three and four-year contract respectively.31 In spite of this unprecedented 
policy, only a very small number of care workers have been able to successfully prolong their stay. 
A major difficulty is that they have to pass the National Nursing Exam in Japanese during their 
training period and consequently often fail as they do not have sufficient time to prepare. Therefore, 
the care workers as well as the sending governments could not reap the expected benefits of the 
EPAs. In order to solve this problem, the Japanese government has carried out additional programs 
to increase the success rate of care workers in the nursing exam by extending their initially contract-
ed stay and providing extra Japanese language courses.32 
This patient government response to the malfunctioning EPA migration program distinguishes it 
from the previous migration policies, especially from the trainee program. The trainee program 
started in the 1950s and acquired its current shape through the amendment of the Immigration Con-
trol Act in 1989.33 Although the trainees’ limited stay of three years and their poorly protected 
working conditions have been criticized for long, the program was only slightly improved in 2009 
by putting their contracts under labor-related regulations and laws. In contrast to this, the Japanese 
                                                
29 Ogawa, Reiko. "Globalization of Care and the Context of Reception of Southeast Asian Care Workers in Japan." 
Southeast Asian Studies 49 (2012). 
30 Maya Kaneko, “Philippine FTA to reshape health care: Trade pact's labor provisions evoke hope, opposition within 
industry.” Japan Times, 13.09.2006, (Access Date: 17.07.2013). 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2006/09/13/national/philippine-fta-to-reshape-health-care/#.UeZszxbq77U. 
31 "EPA ni motozuku gaikokujin kangoshi kaigohukushi ukeire pamhureto." Japan International Corporation of 
Welfare Services, 2012. 
Oh, Sejeong, and Simon Presly. "The Filipino nurse candidates in Japan under the EPA." Roskilde University Digital 
Archive. 12 2012. http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/9236 (accessed 6 23, 2013). 
32 Asato, Wako. "Nurses from Abroad and the Formation of a Dual Labor Market in Japan." Southeast Asian Studies 49, 
no. 4 (2012), p.659. 
Report on the meetings on an easier National Nursing Exame for the EPA care worker candidates. MHLW, 2004. 
Tokurei inodneziajin kangoshi kohosha oyobi tokurei indonezia kaigo hukushi kohoshano koyo kanri, kenshuno jitsetsu 
nadoni kansuru jichinno ichibuwo kaiseisuru ken oyobi tokurei philipinjin kankoshi kohosyano koyo kanri suru jishinno 
ichibuwo kaiseisuruken ni tsuite(One year additional residence as an exemption of the EPA nurse and care workers). 
Government Announcement, MHLW, 2013. 
33 Nana Oishi, "Training or Employment? Japanese Immigration Policy in Dilemma." Asian and Pacific Migration 
Journal 4, no. 2-3 (1995). 
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government has consciously tried to improve the EPA through supportive and steady actions that 
are issued several times a year, even in spite of severe opposition from the Japanese Nursing Asso-
ciation (JNA).34  
Above all, the possibility for the EPA care workers to remain in Japan after their limited first con-
tract marks the biggest difference between the EPA and the trainee program. The Japanese govern-
ment justifies this difference by stating that the EPA migration is related to the overall EPA frame-
work. This distinction implies that migration through its connection to other purposes is able to in-
fluence governments to change their attitudes. This study assumes that the EPAs have an influence 
on migration policies in that they at least bring the governments into more horizontal negotiation 
positions. In contrast, the institutional improvement of the foreign trainee program as part of Japan’s 
ODA efforts has been slow and hesitant, while the Japanese government insists on Japan’s superior 
position with respect to the migrants’ countries of origin by using such rhetorical figures as koku-
saika and “international contribution” to disguise Japan’s need for low-wage and less-skilled work-
ers. 
1.4	  Research	  Questions	  
Globalization and international migration are known to be a challenge to state sovereignty. However, 
in the case of Japan, the acceptance of foreigners has coexisted with Japan’s three principles by la-
beling them as part of kokusaika or “international contribution” and avoiding to call them migrant 
workers. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Japan is dependent on foreign labor. 
A question which I intend to answer in this study is what kind of understanding of kokusaika the 
Japanese government promotes and to what extent it is ready to accept foreigners into Japan, in or-
der to discern general perspectives of the Japanese government on migration. I will do this by look-
ing at the trainee program as well as the kokusaika project, taking foreign students and trainees as 
being representative of Japan’s migration policies in the post-War era. 
This study further aims at a comparison of EPA and trainee migration in order to find out to what 
extent migration, when strongly intertwined with other political issues, exerts an influence on tradi-
tional stances towards migration. In this I depart from this assumption that the EPA migration pro-
                                                
34 JNA NEWS No3. 2007, p.5. 
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gram is different from preceding policies in that it opens up the possibility for the care workers to 
remain in Japan, a change which I attribute to the changing negotiation position of the Japanese 
government. I assume that the Japanese government’s superior position in the trainee program is 
weakened in the EPAs, as EPAs are based on the fundamental equality of the signatory countries. 
The changing negotiation positions influence the Japanese government’s approach to the problems 
of each program with respect to migration. 
The inclusion of a clause of the movement of natural persons in the WTO norms under the GATS 
Mode 4 has been discussed for more than a decade among the WTO member countries.35 The idea 
of tying trade to migration has however been blocked by vetoes,36 although major emigration coun-
tries and a number of economists are favorable to this.37 This study intends to contribute to a vitali-
zation of the discussion through an evaluation of the effects of tying trade to migration as done in 
Japan’s EPAs.   
                                                
35 “Services” WTO. 
36 Alexander Betts, and Kalypso Nicolaidis. " The Trade-Migration Linkage: GATS Mode IV ." Memo prepared for the 
‘Global Trade Ethics Conference’, presented at Princeton University, 19 February 2009. 
37 Dawson, Laura Ritchie. "Labor Mobility and the WTO: The Limits of GATs Mode 4." International Migration 51, no. 
1 (2013); Betts and Nicolaidis 2009; Joscelyn Magdeleine and Andreas Mauer. Measuring GATS Mode 4 Trade Flows. 
Staff Working Paper, the World Trade Organization, 2005; Marion Jansen and Roberta Piermartini, The Impact of Mode 
4 Liberalization on Bilateral Trade Flows. Staff Working Paper, Economic Research and Statistics Division, WTO, 
2005. 
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2.	  Methodology	  
How we know things rather than what we know is a fundamental methodological approach in this 
study. From an ontological positivist position, which asks for the “what”, the increasing number of 
registered foreigners in Japan and the reformed regulations of the trainee program and the EPAs can 
be regarded as indicators that the Japanese government’s attitude on migration is changing in a lib-
eral way. By looking at the policies from another perspective, however, Japan’s use of liberal poli-
cies has been highly selective. For instance, the immigration law and the foreign residents’ registra-
tion system (until 2012: alien registration act) were amended to abandon certain work limitations for 
foreign care workers in 201038 and simplify the registration process for foreign residents.39 Contrary 
to this, the number of asylum seekers admitted to Japan remains constantly low and only 26 and 41 
asylum were granted in 2006 and 2007 respectively.40 Foreign residents, including permanent resi-
dents born and raised up in Japan such as the second and the third generation of Zainichi Koreans 
and Chinese (or Taiwanese), have to carry their registration certificate with them all the time.41 
These examples emphasize the importance of comparative and interpretivist approach42 – the ques-
tion for the “how” –  in order to avoid misleading evaluations at face value, for example interpreting 
the policies as a sign of a liberalization of migration policies and thereby ignoring other policies in 
which no progress is discernible. Inspired by the constant repetition the slogan of “accepting for-
eigners for Japan’s kokusaika” by Japanese policy makers, this study traces back previous policies 
from a hermeneutic perspective. The contextual emphasis of the hermeneutic approach is an ideal 
method to examine and compare the Japanese government’s attitudes towards the EPAs and the 
trainee program in their particularly historical contexts43. 
                                                
38 Until the Japanese government amended the immigration law in 2010, foreign care workers were only able to work in 
Japan for up to seven years. 
39 ‘Start of a new residency management system!,’ the Immigration Bureau of Japan. (Access Date: 29.05.2013). 
http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact_1/en/index.html. 
40 ‘Betsuji 11 Nanminto Nintei sita Jirei’ (Annexed paper 11: A Case of Confirmed Refugees), Annexed Ppaer, the 
Immigration Bureau of Japan 2012. 
41 Alien Registration Act (外国人登録法), Act No. 125 of April 28, 1952, Article 12. 
Atsushi Kondo, “Citizenship Rights for Aliens in Japan” In Citizenship in a Global World:Comparing Citizenship 
Rights for Aliens, eds. Atsushi Kondo. (Palgrave, 2001), p.15-16.  
42 Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating. Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist 
Perspective. (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 24-25. 
43 Jerry Willis, Foundaings of Qualitative Research. (Sage, 2007), p.104. 
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2.1	  Power	  of	  Case-­‐based	  Comparison	  
Comparison is used in a variety of academic fields. Comparative studies can enhance a theory or an 
argument by showing that and how compared objects or subjects are similar or different in different 
aspects or variables.44 Comparative studies can be divided into two: variable-oriented studies and 
case-oriented studies. The former basically describes quantitative or large-Number studies which 
aim at establishing generalized relationships between variables. On the other hand, studies which 
use the latter approach work qualitatively or small-N in order to understand complex units.45 
An important criticism of small-N studies or case-based studies is their limited applicability, in oth-
er words, that their results are difficult to be generalized.46 Nevertheless, many scholars prefer 
small-N or case-based research arguing that this methodology is a powerful tool in social and politi-
cal science as they provide explanations for mechanisms of causality47 and in-depth understanding 
of historical process and motivations.48 Large-N studies often fail to do so and their use lies mainly 
in the development and hardening of larger theories. 
This research focuses on the case of the trainees and EPA care workers. The strength of comparative 
research becomes apparent when a case does not fit the standard models. Bloemraad demonstrates 
how the comparative research design makes us reconsider existing frameworks by theorizing on a 
sub-category or class of cases that are exceptions to the larger model. She even goes as far as to say-
ing that one can challenge the conventional wisdom about how a ‘case’ should be conceptualized.49 
For instance, Donna Gabaccia in her comparison of so-called free Italian and unfree Chinese labor 
migrants reconceptualizes what ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ migrants are.50 
                                                
44 Irene Bloemraad, "The promise and pitfalls of comparative research design in the study of migration." Migration 
Studies (Oxford University Press), 2013.  
45 della Porta and Keating 2008, p.198. 
46 Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five misunderstandings about case-study research." In Qualitative Research Practice, by Clive 
Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium and David Silverman, 402-434. (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
2004), p.420. 
47 David FitzGerald, "A comparativist manifesto for international migration studies." Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2012, 
p.1. 
48 della Porta and Keating 2008, p.202. 
49 Bloemraad 2013, p.3. 
50 Donna Gabaccia, “The "Yellow Peril" and the "Chinese of Europe": Global Perspective on Race and Labor.” Vol. 4, 
In Migration, Migration History, History' , eds. Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen, 177-198. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005). 
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The two migration programs which this study looks at are comparable as they have many things in 
common particularly with regard to the migrants’ residency status, i. e. “trainees” (kenshusei: 研修
生) and “candidates” (kohosha:  候補者), which refers to the EPA care workers. In the Japanese 
context, these terms indicate foreigners who come to Japan with a special visa to learn and practice 
Japanese technology and skills, and in the case of EPA care migrants to become a registered 
nurse/care-worker after passing the national nursing exam. A common feature of the two groups is 
their characters as quasi-employees, who do not fully enjoy the benefits guaranteed to regular em-
ployees. 
On the other hand, there are some significant institutional differences between the two programs. 
The trainee programs only provides for a maximum sojourn of three years51 while the EPA care 
workers have the possibility to additionally stay for up to six years after their three-year candidate 
contract, if they pass the national nursing exam.52 In reality, however, only a handful of EPA candi-
dates pass the exam. Even though the institutional frameworks of the two programs are different, the 
temporary nature of the migrants’ residency implies the continuity of Japan’s three principles on 
migration. 
2.2	  Research	  Design	  
Designing the comparison between the two categories of migrants, it is crucial to grasp what kind of 
institutional developments they have undergone, how often changes take place and how long it takes 
to implement them, what aims they pursue and by whom they are initiated, and whether they are ef-
fective or not. Comparison in various aspects will help to understand how external interests and 
pressures such as the overall goal of EPAs affect institutional change, and to judge whether the 
changes ultimately lead to an improvement of the migratory process or in what respect envisaged 
results cannot be achieved. 
In order to conduct the comparative case study, I will look at the negotiation processes in the EPA 
and the trainee program by using newspaper articles, websites of governmental organizations, gov-
                                                
51 Outline of the Technical Intern Training Program. JITCO. (Access Date: 8.7.2013). 
http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/itp/index.html. 
52 A pamphlet in accepting foregin nurses and care workers according to the EPA. Pamphlet, JICWELS, 2013. p.22; 
heisei 20nen homusho kokucji dai 506 go (Notice 506). Notice, Ministry of Justice. 2008, p.8. 
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ernment reports, diplomatic agreements, and research done by other scholars. Newspapers are im-
portant to gather information about a variety of opinions and categorize conflicting interests of gov-
ernment departments and stakeholders. The government websites of the Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW) of 
Japan, provide official positions visible in new regulations, official statements, and legal changes in 
the EPA and the trainee program. In addition, the study also looks at the Japan International Coop-
eration of Welfare Services (JICWELS) and the Japan International Training Cooperation Organiza-
tion (JITCO), which are responsible for the management of respectively candidates and trainees. In 
order to understand the change of government attitudes toward migration, the “Basic Plan for Immi-
gration Control” issued by the Ministry of Justice every five years is an invaluable source. Records 
of “Research Meetings” about the development of the trainee and EPA programs as well as previous 
studies, which will be discussed in detail in the following section, are also helpful to conduct this 
study. 
When I refer to “the Japanese government”, not only the Prime Minister is meant but also the dif-
ferent government actors which are in particular involved in migration issues, such as the ministries. 
Japan’s political system is a double-chamber parliamentary system, and the Prime Minister is rela-
tively powerless when compared to a presidential system. The position of the Japanese Prime Minis-
ter has been notoriously fluctuant, and during the last decades, only Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) 
and Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) were able to remain in office for more than two or three years. 
It was during their incumbencies, that efforts to attract foreign students and the negotiations for the 
EPA respectively started. Japan’s main legislative organ is the National Diet, and the conservative 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has continuously been the majority party except for two interrup-
tions from 1993-1994 and 2009-2012. Except for the periods under the strong leadership of Prime 
Ministers Nakasone and Koizumi, migration policies shaped more by the ministerial bureaucracy 
than by policy makers whose authority was weak. The Ministry of Justice, under whose umbrella 
the Immigration Bureau of Japan is situated, is in charge of handling immigration affairs and takes a 
strongly restrictive and exclusionary position towards immigration. The MOFA, on the other hand, 
is more favorable to immigration, considering the diplomatic position of Japan in the international 
society. The MHLW, which merged with the Ministry of Labor in 2001 and is in charge of the 
trainee and EPA program to develop, has shown an ambivalent position because, as on one hand, 
there is an increasing need for foreign labor especially in certain labor sectors. On the other hand, 
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however, the MHLW has questioned what concrete benefits are expected from international migra-
tion in domestic labor market.53 Lastly, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 
which has normally little interest in migration, is the key actor in negotiation and development the 
whole EPA plan. 
The ministries as well as politicians use the term “foreigners (gaikokujin: 外国人)” rather than “im-
migrants (iminsha: 移民者).” According to the glossary on migration published by International Or-
ganization for Migration (IOM), migrants can be understood to persons “moving to another country 
of region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect for themselves.”54 On 
the other hand, foreigners refer to persons “belonging to, or owing an allegiance to, another state.”55 
Migrants have consequently more comprehensive meaning by including their motivation, so it is 
seemingly difficult for the Japanese government to use the terminology because most of the foreign 
subjects in Japan have their own reasons that should not match to the definition of migrants. In fact, 
the Basic Plan for Immigration Control published by the Ministry of Justice does not use the term 
‘migrant,’ but other terminology designating each foreign group such as trainees, foreign nationals 
of Japanese descent (Nikkeijin), candidates and special permanent residents namely Zainichi Kore-
ans. These are de facto migrants, but the Japanese government gives them the tag ‘foreign’ instead 
of migrants. Thus, I use ‘foreigners’ rather than migrants in order to reflect how Japan express and 
recognize ‘foreigners,’ which are inherently enhanced the meaning of ‘outsiders,’ who might never 
become ‘Japanese.’ 
2.3	  Literature	  Overview	  
As a good guidance for how to explore migration from a macro perspective, Stephan Castles pro-
vides a crucial introduction to the dynamics in international migration. Aside from many other as-
pects of his immense work, he was deeply interested in the workings of the Gastarbeiter system in 
Europe. His research with Kosack56 illustrates how migrants are structurally segregated from ‘na-
tives’ and how their status as subordinated takes shape and perpetuates the class structure in coun-
                                                
53 Chiavacci 2012, p.36. 
Ministry of Helath, Labour, and Welfare Service Guide, MHLW, 2011. 
54 Glossary on Migration, International Organization for Migration, 2004, p.40. 
55 IOM 2004, p.25. 
56 Stephan Castles and Godula Kosack. Immigrant Workers and Class Sturcture in Western Europe. (Oxford University 
Press, 1973). 
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tries like Great Britain, France, Germany and Switzerland. Recently his research focus has shifted to 
general questions of South-North migration, why international migration does not stop in spite of 
increasing efforts by states to prevent migration movements through measures such as forced depor-
tations, increasing border security as between the USA and Mexico, and sanctions against employ-
ers of illegal immigrants as were introduced in Japan in the early 1990s. 
Regarding the fundamental question “why people move”, Castles and Miller,57 and Massay et al.58 
give a good summary of various factors which shape international migration and illustrate why in-
ternational migration continues across time and space ranging from wage differences between North 
and South and shortages of labor in the North to transnational networks supporting transnational 
migrants. 
In order to stop the flow, as governments’ restrictive policies prove ineffective, the only solution 
seems to lie in curing the root causes by closing the gaps between North and South. This would re-
quire a huge amount of money, time and cooperation among countries as they would have to reform 
their trade policies, provide development assistances, and foster regional integration. Therefore, 
Castles is skeptical towards all durable solutions to stop international migration at least in the short 
term.59 From a more liberal standpoint, Jonathon Moses argues for free movement while labeling 
advocates control measures as narrow-minded, as they ignore the tremendous benefits of global mi-
gration.60 He also points out that the public fear of migration, that a massive influx of “foreigners” 
endangers national identity and social stability, is a remnant of a naïve belief in state sovereignty. 
The powerful forces which cause international migration often conflict with states’ determination to 
control the flow. Regarding the question whether nation-states may be able control the flow of mi-
gration at all, opinions are divided among scholars. While Castles is skeptical because states’ poli-
cies have not worked as effectively as they were intended to,61 James F. Hollifield regards nation-
states as being still an important actor. Rather than economic factors of demand and supply, his em-
                                                
57 Stephan Castles, "Development and Migration – Migration and Development: What comes first?" Social Science 
Research Council Conference "Migration and Development: Future Directions for Research and Policy". New York , 
2008. 
58 Douglas S. Massey, J. Edward Taylor, Adela Pallegrino, Ali Kouaouci, Graeme Hugo, and Joaquin Arago. "Theories 
of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." Population and Development Review 19, no. 3 (1993). 
59 Castles and Miller 2003, p.284-286. 
60 Moses 2006. 
61  Stephan Castles, "Why Migration Policies Fail." Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, no. 2 (2004) p.205-206. 
Castles and Miller, 2003. Chapter 2. 
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phasis is on the growing role of rights norms which ought to be shaped by the states.62 Alexander 
Betts63 and Yasemin Soysal64 provide a framework how to include human rights norms in national 
migration policies in order to initiate a discussion on global migration governance. On the other 
hand, Michael S. Teitelbaum65 and Myron Weiner66 suggest that migration is a political instrument 
for foreign policy. 
In a broader perspective, however, state sovereignty in the era of intensifying globalization seems 
much more complex. Saskia Sassen argues that increasing supra-national activities reconfigure the 
territorial exclusivity of sovereign states, while immigration is renationalizing politics through the 
control of entry.67 Castles has also pointed to similar ambivalences by demonstrating how Japan tol-
erates undocumented migrants rather than to accept migrants officially to solve Japan’s labor short-
age in certain job sectors.68 On the other hand, Neil Brenner69 discusses the de-territorialization of 
the nation-state due to supra-national activities, while at the same time the states’ political space is 
re-territorialized by their active participation in supra-national entities such as NAFTA and ASEAN. 
Therefore, the EPAs can be seen as part of Japan’s effort to reaffirm her political place in Asia.  
In order to give a short summary of Japan’s preceding migration policies, it is useful to first divide 
those into three periods. The first period covers a relatively long time span – from the end of the 19th 
century to the 1970s. This period witnessed the process of Japanese nation-state building through 
defining identities based on race, ethnicity, citizenship and culture in. Regarding this topic, I refer to 
works by Tessa Morris-Suzuki,70 Jennifer Robertson,71 and Carol Gluck72 as key texts to understand 
                                                
62 James F. Hollifield, "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the State Back In"?" In Migration 
Theory: Talking Across the Disciplines, by Caroline Bieler Brettell and James Frank Hollifield, 137-186. (Routledge, 
2000); James F. Hollifield, "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We "Bring the State Back In"?" In 
Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines, edited by Caroline B. Brettell and James Frank Hollifield, 183-238. 
(Routledge, 2008). 
63 Betts 2013. 
64 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migration and Postnational Membership in Europe. (The University 
of Chicago Press, 1994). 
65 Micahel S. Teitelbaum, "International Relations and Asian Migrations." center for migration studies 5, no. 3 (1987), 
p.78. 
66 Myron Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations." Population and Development Review 11, no. 
3 (1985). 
67 Sasskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, (Colombia University, 1996). 
68 Castles “Why Migration” 2004, p.215. 
69 Neil Brenner, "Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in globalization studies." Theory 
and Society 28 (1999). 
70 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventiong Japan: Time, Space, Nation. (M.E. Sharpe, 1998). 
71 Jennifer Robertson, "It Takes a Village: Internationalization and Nostalgia in Postwar Japan." In Mirror of Modernity: 
Invented Tradition of Modern Japan, by Stephen Vlastos, 110-129. (University of California, 1988). 
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how the Japanese government and influential intellectuals have defined and redefined concepts of 
identity by including and excluding “foreign subjects” since the late 19th century. 
The second period ranges from the 1980s to the 1990s when migrant workers started entering Japan 
in larger numbers through so-called side doors, answering to Japan’s increasing need for additional 
labor. In this period, vigorous political debates about whether less skilled migrants should be ac-
cepted into Japan took place. Wayne A. Cornelius,73 Kristin Surak,74 Atushi Kondo,75 Hiroshi 
Tanaka76, Steven Spencer,77 and Keiko Yamanaka78 have worked and written on these topics. A 
commonality of their studies, which deal with language students, foreign trainees, Nikkeijin, and 
undocumented migrants, is the observation that the Japanese government’s attitude toward migra-
tion remains restrictive and that rhetorical figures like “kokusaika” and “international contribution” 
form part of this attitude. Concerning the trainee program in particular, studies by Nana Oishi79 and 
Haruno Shimada80 focus on the legal status and the historical development of the program. I make 
ample use of Japanese newspapers dealing with discussions among politicians about foreign stu-
dents. The late 1980s are crucial in that immigration became a divisive political issue, which led to 
the reform of the Immigration Control Act in 1989 and the introduction of the trainee program in 
1993. Along with the increasing foreigners, it became more apparent that most of them engage in 
less-skilled and socially recognized inferior jobs. Harumi Befu81 and Vera Mackie82 worked on the 
stigmatization of migrant workers.  
The last period ranges from the beginning of the 21st century until today. Whether this period should 
be regarded as a turning point in migration policies of Japan is an issue of controversy. Scholars 
such as Vogt and Chiavacci highlight changing attitudes of Japanese politicians on migration and a 
                                                                                                                                                            
72 Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: deology in the Late Meiji Period. (Princeton University Press, 1985). 
73 Cornelius 1994. 
74 Surak 2008. 
75 Kondo 2001. 
76 Tanaka 1995. 
77 Steven A. Spencer, "Illegal Migrant Laborers in Japan." International Migration Review 26, no. 3 (1993). 
78 Yamanaka 2008. 
79 Oishi 1995. 
80 Shimada 1994. 
81 Harumi Befu, "The global context of Japan outside Japan." In Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese 
presence in Asia, Europe, and America, by Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis, 1-23. (Routledge, 2001); Befu, 
“Nationalism and Nihonjinron,” 1993. 
82 Vera Mackie, "Japayuki Cinderella girl: Containing the immigrant other." Japanese Studies 18, no. 1 (2007). 
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shift in the evaluation of foreigners in Japan’s immigration debates.83 For instance, foreign students 
were once seen as a cheap labor force, but recently politicians, entrepreneurs and universities have 
begun to perceive the foreign students as prospective skilled labor, which might contribute in vital-
izing Japan’s struggling economy. Probably it would be argued that the EPA system opens a new 
chapter in Japan’s migration policies in terms of opening the front door, but the systematic structure 
of EPA is likely to disrupt the original goal. In order to look more details, I rely on studies done by 
Japanese scholars.84 Their surveys on the care worker candidates and accepting care facilities are 
important sources to diagnose the current circumstance, but their studies have a limit in connecting 
their study to international migration. If the studies prove the difference between policy output and 
policy outcome at a realistic point of view, the hermeneutic perspective will be helpful to analyze 
the usage of globalization and political debates through government documents such as records of 
special meetings on the EPA and the trainee programs from the Ministries. 
  
                                                
83 Gabriele Vogt, "An Invisible Policy Shift: International Health-Care Migration to Japan." Paper prepared for the 
American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting. 2009, p.22; Chiavacci 2012, p.32. 
84 Shun Ohno. "Southeast Asian Nurses and Caregiving Workers Transcending the National Boundaries: An Overview 
of Indonesian and Filipino Workers in Japan and Abroad." Southeast Asian Studies 49, no. 4 (2012). 
Yoshichika Kawaguchi, Reiko Ogawa, O. Yuko Hirano, and Shun Ohno. "Exploring Learning Problems of Filipino 
Nurse Candidates Working in Japan: Based on the Results of a Practice National Board Examination of Japan Given in 
English." Southeast Asian Studies 49, no. 4 (2012). 
Yuko O. Hirano, Reiko Ogawa, and Shun Ohno. "A Comparative Study of Filipino and Indonesian Candidates for 
Registered Nurse and Certified Care Worker Coming to Japan under Economic Partnership Agreements: An Analysis of 
the Results of Questionnaire Surveys on the Socioeconomic Attribution of the Respondents and Their Motivation to 
Work in Japan." Southeast Asian Studies 49, no. 4 (2012). 
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3.	  International	  Migration	  and	  Nation-­‐states	  in	  the	  era	  of	  Globalization	  
as	  Theoretical	  Frames	  
The oft-heard argument that Japan is not a country of immigration implies Japan’s homogeneity and 
unique national identity. This self-hypnosis, which blinks out many aspects of Japanese history and 
the existence of zainichi Koreans, is usually used to justify efforts to avert less restrictive immigra-
tion policies. It is crucial to understand this kind of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia, which evi-
dently is not limited to Japan but can be found in other countries as well, to make sense of the Japa-
nese government’s insistence on the three tenets of migration. An elucidation of this nationalist con-
text will also benefit a clearer understanding of the peculiar situation in Japan where the three tenets, 
which perpetuate the illusion of a homogeneous society, can coexist with front- and side-door mi-
gration. The first two sections of this chapter touch upon the process of the Japanese nation-building 
process, the main constituents of the public fear of immigrants, and the difficult relationship be-
tween national identity and the attraction of foreigners. 
The third section of the chapter illustrates the diversity of globalization to understand what kind of 
globalization the Japanese government conceives and how she talks about it. In today’s era of glob-
alization, the movement of various commodities, services and persons across nation-states’ borders 
has become more intense and diversified. Kokusaika, which means “internationalization” respec-
tively “globalization”, is a term which is widely used in various Japanese contexts, in particular in 
the (temporary) integration of foreigners in Japan. Taking the diversity of globalization as a point of 
departure, the theoretical part elaborates on changes in nation-states’ territoriality and redefinition of 
nation-states’ role in global society and global migration governance. This section also focuses on 
the clause of movement of natural persons under GATS Mode 4 which is important in the EPA 
framework. 
The last part of the chapter explains how migration can be a political tool to cope with growing 
competition in the liberalized global economy. Naturally, politicians and various IOs have different 
opinions on international migration, and consequently discussions on reforming migration policies 
are often delayed or blocked. This section illustrates the role of different interests in decision-
making processes. 
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3.1	  Is	  Japan	  a	  homogeneous	  society?	  
Nation-states, which are today accepted as the standard political units in international politics, are a 
fusion of the two concepts of state and nation. Modern nation-states are understood as a political 
and systemic entity, an understanding which is neatly summarized in Seton-Watson defined of a 
state as “a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its 
citizens.”85 Max Weber’s definition of state, on the other hand, stresses the function of states as mo-
nopolizing the right to use force in relation to a defined human community within a particular terri-
tory.86 The nation, according to Weber, is an ambiguous concept which contains various elements 
like the creation of “a specific sentiment of solidarity” or “homogeneity”87 among its members. To 
make people of different identities into the “imagined community” of a nation, a particular feeling 
of solidarity has to be spread through standardized language, geographical unity, and legends of 
common descent, shared culture etc. The imaginary of the nation is created and developed through 
the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group,88 and the demarcation of the group with respect to 
“the other”. The exercise of control over flows of migration is a fundamental function of the nation-
state, which has to prevent any potential “invasions” of the community89 and has to regulate the ad-
mission or rejection of new members.90 
Nation-states have obtained their capacities to control migration through the transition from person-
al loyalties – serfdom and slavery – to the modern state in Europe.91 A previously immobile group 
of individuals tied to the land was dislodged, what led them to adopt new identities within a state 
building process that created territorial boundaries by granting rights, privileges and duties to the 
                                                
85 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States. (University of Cambridge, 1977), p.1. 
86 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation." In The Vocation Lectures: "Science as a Vocation", "Politics as a Vocation", by 
Max Weber, edited by Tracy B. Strong and David Owen, translated by Rodney Livingstone, 32-94. (Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2004), p.33. 
87 Max Weber, "Volume 2: Chapter 9: Political Communities." In Economy and Society: An Outline of International 
Sociology, by Max Weber, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, translated by Ephraim Fischoff, et al., 901-940. 
(University of California Press, 1978), p.922-923. 
88 Weber, 1978, p.925. 
89 Aristide R. Zolberg, "Changing Sovereignty Games and International Migration." Indiana Journal of Global Studies 2, 
no. 1 (1994), p.160. 
90 Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State: The United Nation, Germany and the Great Britain. (Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p.1-2. 
91 John Torpey, "Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate "Means of Movement"." 
Sociological Theory 16, no. 3 (1998), p.242; Moses 2006, p.42. 
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individuals. The concept of “citizenship” with its exclusionary and inclusionary properties of com-
pulsory education, conscription, and national welfare consolidated national identities.92  
Modern Japan emerged after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 which abolished the feudal institution of 
the shogunate and made Japan into a monarchy under the nominal leadership of an emperor, who 
was under the strong influence of an oligarchical clique of reformers. Reforms were instituted in a 
rapid pace which transformed Japan into a modern constitutional state with the first Diet (parliament) 
gathering in 1890. Simultaneously with the state building, a nation-building project was systemati-
cally pursued to incorporate all the people into the state and make them citizens (kokumin) of them 
what was called “the new Japan.”93 
The transformation of Japan into a modern nation-state is also the result of a continuous reworking, 
reinterpretation and redefinition of the concept of “foreign subject”.94 Ainu people, who had their 
own language and were hunters and fishermen, as well as long-independent Okinawans95 had origi-
nally not been conceived of as ethnic Japanese Wa-jin or Yamato people,96 although they had been 
required to go on ceremonial missions to the shogun in the capital Edo.97 During the Meiji Restora-
tion, as part of radical redefinitions of identity, Ainu and Okinawans were reinterpreted to be back-
ward Japanese, replacing their “foreignness” to “backwardness”. The different aspects of Ainu and 
Okinawa life styles and customs suddenly became a phenotypical marker showing their underdevel-
opment in terms of modern Japanese ‘civilization’, which could be overcome by education. Back-
wardness and underdevelopment were therefore characteristics of Ainu and Okinawans’ Japanese-
ness.98 Their Japanization was being a project which should be achieved through multiple intrusions 
into their daily lives with the means of standardized education, army duty, and the local government 
bureaucracy.  
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During the interwar period, racial purity, which derived from the shintoistic belief that the Japanese 
originated from a common blood line and that the imperial family were direct descendents of the 
gods, was used to juxtapose a unique Japanese people against Europeans and North Americans. The 
Japanese nation was constructed as a family-like national body (kokutai) with the emperor as the 
father of the nation. While the racial purity became in this way the basis for Japanese nationalism, it 
at the same time was an obstacle to the inclusion of Japan’s colonial subjects and colonized people 
of the homeland such as Ainu and Okinawans into a shared identity. In order to appeal to the colo-
nial subjects, mainly through the ideology of pan-Asianism, required a new definition and a broader 
sense being Japanese. This new definition made reference to Japan’s historical and contemporary 
experiences of adaptation to different cultures – Western and Chinese. “Japanese” suddenly became 
a term indicating flexibility, giving the idea of a people that is defined by radical cultural changes 
through the repetitive absorption and transformation of foreign culture. In other words, the term 
“Japanese” can be expanded to include the global sphere, where all nations, specifically East Asians 
and Southeast Asians, assume their proper place under a paternalistic and all-encompassing Japan.99 
In this way, all colonial subjects can become Japanese if they accept Japanese guidance, i. e. are 
willing to be educated in Japanese and enlightened in a modern or Japanese way. This idea of citi-
zenship takes as a prerequisite not just Japanese birth but the loyalty and willing submission as the 
basis of the Japanese nation.100 However, in order to ensure Japanese superiority as well as colonial 
subjects’ subordinate status, arguments of backwardness similar to those used for Ainu and Okina-
wans come into play.101 
After the war, Japan’s imperialist past was seen as an obstacle for the future.102 “Prominent political 
thinkers like Nambara Shigeru emphasized the need for Japan to find a new unifying ideology to 
replace the lost imperial dream and pointed to the new opportunities for national cohesion now that 
the “outsiders from overseas territories had returned home and a pure Japan had been re-
established.”103 This statement shows how Japan should recover its focus on racial purity after Ko-
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reans and Chinese (from Taiwan) had lost their Japanese citizenship.104 As Castles remarks, increas-
ingly politicized notions of culture and cultural difference have replaced ideas of racial superiority 
to demarcate the self from the other.105 As the imagination of racial superiority was no longer ac-
ceptable in post-war Japan, the culturalistic idea of pure Japanese-ness has taken over.  
This brief summary of Japan’s nation-state building has shown that Japanese notions of racial purity 
and a homogeneous society are socially constructed imaginaries whose importance developed in a 
specific historic context. Benedict Anderson in his seminal study on the cultural construction of na-
tions describes how these are imagined by their members through the various means such as sym-
bols, languages, and geographies.106 As the concept of nation is abstract and artificial, the definition 
of the relationship between the other and the host polity is subject to changes and is transformed ac-
cording to the states needs.107 The “other” has played a crucial role in defining national identities by 
allowing for a clear differentiation and demarcation between “foreigners” and “the nation”. Alt-
hough therefore there is no authenticity in the idea that Japan is a homogeneous society, it is a pow-
erful imaginary which continues to exert rhetorical and ideological influence. 
3.2	  Securitization	  of	  Migration	  
“One of the main reasons that people fear any discussion about open borders is the implicit 
threat of hundreds of millions, maybe billions, of poor immigrants knocking at the developed 
world’s door.” (Moses 2006, p.165.) 
There is a public fear in the developed world that international migration may become a threat to its 
wealth, security and sense of community.108 The public fear is concerned with questions of econom-
ic security, criminal activity, national security and cultural identity.109 
Regarding economic security, there exists a worry about social and economic instability which mi-
grants are supposed to cause. Some scholars believe that an ongoing influx of migrants leads to an 
                                                
104 After the Japanese defeat, Japanese citizenship was reserved to those who could prove that their families originated 
from the Japanese islands. 
105 Castles and Miller 2003, p.40. 
106 B. Anderson 2006, p.6-7. 
107 Soysal 1994, p.14. 
108 Moses 2006, p.137. 
109 Ibid., p.189. 
 
 
26 
increasing economic burden as limited social welfare resources have to be shared with migrants.110 
Another similar concern is that migrants take indigenous peoples’ jobs and are responsible for fall-
ing salaries and worsening working condition due to their willingness to work for less.111 Some 
economists argue that the existence of unskilled migrants delays the automation of industrial sectors 
and drives a state’s economy into a vicious circle as it subsequently becomes more dependent on 
unskilled migrant workers.112 
The validity of such arguments, however, is highly doubtful. Economists Friedberg and Hunt’s re-
search on the impact of immigrant workers on host countries revealed that there is no sufficient and 
persuasive proof that immigrants have an adverse impact on the wages and employment opportuni-
ties of the indigenous population.113 Regarding the question of welfare, Freeman argues that long-
term and permanent migrants cause a decline in the general quality of welfare, while temporary mi-
gration is a net beneficiary because migrants are much less likely to make use of the various welfare 
services.114 
The second widespread fear of immigration is that the influx of migrants is creates instability in the 
public order as migrants are more likely to commit crimes than the rest of the population. Counter-
arguments state that there is no or very little correlation between immigration and the crime rate.115 
An important point here is that the stigmatization of migrants as criminals is an idea for which there 
is no evidence and that migrants are just made into scapegoats for all social problems. Spencer, 
however, suggests that exploitation by employers causes migrants to commit crimes.116 In a similar 
vein, Castles and Kosack say that the manipulation of public fear is an expedient measure which 
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politicians employ to move the responsibility for socio-economic malfunctions to immigrants.117 
Thus, it is not only a problem of migrants themselves who are responsible for problems of crime, 
but the unhealthy migratory process which entails exploitation, poor working conditions, low sala-
ries, and migrants’ isolation.  
The relation between international migration and national security has become an important issue in 
international relations since the 9/11 terror attacks in New York and the devastating train bombings 
in Madrid and London. Although international migration can have a negative effect on national se-
curity and the sovereignty of states,118 it is still an open question whether more international migra-
tion makes it easier to engage in terrorist activities.119 
Even cultural, religious, and racial differences have been made into factors concerning security. Pe-
ter Brimelow’s 1995 book Alien Nation120 received extremely divided reviews when it claimed that 
culturally and racially different migrants damaged the core values of the United States. This kind of 
uncomfortable feeling toward migrants is not a new thing, however, and parallels reactions to Polish 
immigration to Germany, the Irish in Britain, and the Italians in France a century ago. A comparison 
between old and new xenophobia by Lucassen shows how the migrants have been blamed for socio-
economic instability across time and space, due to their different cultural, socioeconomic, political 
and religious backgrounds.121 
Cultural homogeneity and national identity are controversial concepts as cultural difference and 
ethnic-genealogical citizenship122 are vague and difficult to define. A large number of scholars123 
are skeptical that something like cultural homogeneity can possibly exist. Castles and Miller argue 
that it is difficult to have clear core values and behavioral norms within a plurality of cultures and 
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traditions.124 In a similar fashion, the idea of “assimilation” has been challenged on the grounds that 
the thought of “becoming the same as everyone else” is only possible if one assumes that indige-
nous people all share the same experiences and cultural values.125 
Although the issue of immigration is frequently politicized and problematized as a social chal-
lenge,126 Freeman points out that there is a scarcity of information on immigration given to the pub-
lic which causes misperceptions about the characteristics and consequences of migration flows.127 
Thus, securitization of migration, the making of migration into a security issue, can easily appeal to 
the public and certain populist politicians. 
According to Castles, Kosack and Miller, there are no rigid divisions based on race, ethnicity or cit-
izenship status, but only class stratifications. Class stratification leads the social stigmatization of 
ethnic and other sorts of groups if they become overrepresented in disadvantaged occupations.128 
This social stigmatization overlaps with existing stereotypes of immigrants as dirty, diseased, or 
quarrelsome.129 In other words, securitization of migration does not only serve keep restriction on 
immigration, but excludes immigrants as a group from political power by placing them in the inferi-
or strata of social hierarchy.  
3.3	  Globalization	  as	  a	  threat,	  competition	  and	  pressure	  to	  nation-­‐states	  
Nation building and the securitization of migration as explained in the preceding sections are a nex-
us around which the three tenets which the Japanese government has pursed in migration policies 
are built. If we accept Weber’s definition that states monopolize the legitimate use of force, state 
sovereignty is in question when economic liberalization and globalization boost international trade 
and international migration which can no longer effectively controlled. 
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In the sense that globalization stimulates international migration, migration and globalization as 
combined are directly responsible for weakening the state’s sovereignty.130 However, many scholars 
do not accept this interpretation.131 Indeed, various meanings are attached to globalization, the most 
important of them being the redefinition of the role of nation-states and the idea of global migration 
governance. 
Luke Martell divides globalization theories into three waves: globalist, skeptical, and post-skeptical 
or transformationalist. The first wave of globalization theory emphasizes the flow of capital, the 
roles of multinational corporations, and economic interdependencies which tend to diminish the 
sovereignty of states and the autonomy of their domestic economies. The second wave disagrees 
that globalization goes against state sovereignty because nation-states remain powerful in their own 
boundaries and participate and intervene as important actors in the process of globalization.132 For 
instance, free trade is hampered by protectionism and state interventions and becomes responsible 
for global inequality and poverty.133 Therefore, skeptics prefer to speak of internationalization rather 
than globalization. Transformationalists as the third wave take a position similar to the skeptics, but 
focus more on dynamics of change and contradictory developments within globalization.134 Accord-
ing to Colin Hay and David Marsh, scholars of the third wave, globalization is no more than a myth 
that does not contain any meaning in itself. Globalization as a process or a tendency is “the product 
of human interaction, the product of subjects making history, but not in circumstances of their own 
choosing.”135 
The Japanese term kokusaika (国際化) refers to globalization or internationalization depending on 
the context. In the use of the Ministry of Justice, kokusaika has recently been translated as “interna-
tionalization and globalization” together.136 Harumi Befu has illustrated the shifting sense in the us-
age of kokusaika in the Japanese context. During the 1970s-1980s the term kokusaika had mainly 
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been translated in Japan as “internationalization”, referring to the multilateral relationships between 
two or more countries. The meaning of kokusaika has since expanded by the inclusion of various 
actors involved in processes of globalization, and by implying not only economic globalization but 
also the globalization “culture”, “values”, and “ideologies”.137 In contrast to this, Robertson tries to 
differentiate internationalization from globalization in the Japanese context: “Whereas ‘internation-
alization’ is used most often to convey the self-conscious pursuit of ‘soft’ or affective social rela-
tions within Japan, ‘globalization’ refers to ‘hard’ economic and political linkages between Japan 
and other nation-states, which may include an affective veneer.”138 Kokusaika contains a multitude 
of connotations, for example as being a challenge to Japan’s homogeneity, a mirror showing Japan’s 
isolation in the global community, and a self-imposed outer pressure to open up Japan to the world. 
What is essential about the three waves of globalization theory and the multi-dimensionality of the 
term kokusaika is that they indicate that there exist a variety of interpretations regarding nation-
states in de-territorializing state-centric spatiality. Territorialization, according to Neil Brenner, has 
a nuance similar to nation-state building. Simply said, state-centric territorialization is a never-
ending process of forming a concrete political space through practices reifying the abstract idea of 
homogeneity.139 As a consequence of this process, our conceptions of state power, citizenship, de-
mocracy, political and cultural identities, etc. have been locked in a state-centric territorial trap.140 
Globalization researchers who share the views of the first wave of globalization theory, try to move 
beyond the state-centric geography by arguing the existence of a process of de-territorialization. 
De-territorialization is a phenomenon which unwinds the nexus between power and national bound-
aries. Nation-states still are a fundamental factor in defense, public order and welfare, while in their 
actions they cannot ignore the imperatives of global market.141 According to Brenner, the process of 
de-territorialization, however, is accompanied by a simultaneous process of re-territorialization. He 
conceives of de-territorialization not as passively occuring, but as counteracted by vigorous inter-
ventions of nation-states which contributes to the re-territorialization of political space. For example, 
supra-national organization like the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN and other give evidence that states have 
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promoted economic globalization by consolidating regional competitiveness as protective barriers to 
global competition.142  
An outstanding phenomenon in the process of de- and re-territorialization, is the increasing govern-
ance by non- and supra-governmental actors. Governance, according to Rosenau, refers to activities 
backed by shared goals, which do not necessarily originate from legal and formal authorities.143 
Global governance refers to governance on the global level and consists consequently of various 
norms and orders that regulate national governments as well as transnational actors.144 Indeed, one 
can see many examples for a growing consensus on global governance as embodies in the WTO, the 
UN, or regional organizations as those mentioned above. 
However, the development of global governance on migration remains relatively slow in progress. 
Although there exist International Labour Offices for migrant workers in the ILO and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UHHCR) as well as the Global Commission on Interna-
tional Migration (GCIM),145 the International Civil Aviation organization (ICAO), the Global Fo-
rum on Migration and Development (GFMD)146 and a multitude of NGOs, there is no central UN 
institution for international migration. 
In this regard, Alexander Betts suggests alternative forms of global migration governance: multilat-
eralism, embedded governance, regionalism respectively regional governance such as the EU and 
the NAFTA, bilateralism, and unilateralism.147 Multilateralism refers to the international organiza-
tions mentioned above. Embedded governance signifies a broader inclusion of pre-existing bodies 
into the larger system. Although there is no powerful and coherent migration governance, other pre-
existing laws and norms such as international human rights law and maritime law are capable of set-
ting acceptable boundaries for state behavior on migration. Unilateralism as meaning the vigorous 
intervention of sending countries in the process of international migration can also be part of global 
migration governance.148 Bilateral agreements also encompass aspects of global migration govern-
ance in the signing of agreements on visas, circular migration, knowledge sharing, border manage-
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ment, rescue at sea, etc.149 These suggestions extend the concept of global migration governance by 
incorporating governments’ intervention. 
This comprehensive understanding of global migration governance shows how nation states respect 
and follow norms and regulations made by themselves beyond the states’ political space. The trade-
migration link in the EPA is an offshoot of global migration governance, in this case - WTO norms. 
Basic principles of the WTO are the promotion of transparent trade among member countries 
through rules negotiated and signed by the members.150 Under GATS, services can be traded inter-
nationally in four different ways. GATS Mode 4 implies the possibility to include the movement of 
natural persons: “Mode 4 refers to the presence of persons of one WTO member in the territory of 
another for the purpose of providing a service.” The WTO argues that this does not mean that per-
sons can seek free access to the employment markets in member countries,151 and the provider of 
services are limited in a certain type of high-skilled labors such as lawyers. Member states, however, 
have different opinions how to interpret the clause. Major labor sending countries such as the Phil-
ippines and India have demanded including the movement of natural persons in the WTO norm, 
while the U.S is the major vetoer. Some studies argue that current restrictions on temporary labor 
migration cause net costs to receiving and sending countries which could be saved in this way by 
establishing transparent and safe remittance and circular migration system.152 Concerning on the lit-
tle known of scope and impact of movement of people, on the other hand, other scholars recom-
mend bilateral migration agreements rather than the comprehensive application of GATS Mode 4.153 
There is no general agreement, therefore, who are the subjects of the clause, and how long and often 
they can move and work among signatory countries. 
With regard to it, the Japanese government interpreted Mode 4 comprehensively and extended trad-
able categories by including natural persons. According to Japan’s 2010 report on FTAs/EPAs,154 
the decision was made in order to overcome limitations caused by the Most Favorable Nation (MFN) 
clause, which grants equal trade advantages to signatory countries under the WTO norms. In order 
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to foster more favorable trade relations than other WTO member countries, the Japanese govern-
ment interpreted the clause strategically. The opening of domestic markets following global govern-
ance norms, therefore, neither implies a weakening of state sovereignty nor the autonomy of politi-
cal actors. There rather exists an entanglement between activities of nation-states and global gov-
ernance through the states redefinition of agreed norms. 
3.4	  Globalization	  as	  a	  political	  instrument	  and	  political	  complex	  in	  decision-­‐making	  
processes	  
According to Hollifield, “states can act to distort or delay the development of international markets 
(for goods, services, capital and labor), but they cannot stop it.”155 The Japanese governments have 
long stuck to the position not to accept migrant workers through official recruitment programs. In 
spite of this, Japan did never fully confirm to her proclaimed three tenets of migration, and this sec-
tion will show in what ways these were bent. 
Push-pull factors are often used to explain why people migrate. Based on the economic imbalances 
between South and North, the push-pull factors consist for example of income differences and pro-
spective social benefits in receiving countries. Furthermore, world system analysis regards labor as 
a resource tradable across national boundaries.156 These push-pull factors have recently lost credibil-
ity in the study of migration because they do not sufficiently explain how international migration is 
perpetuated. Nonetheless, I would like to briefly touch upon client-politics, which is also seen as 
part of push-pull factors from the perspective of political science, in order to explain how different 
interest groups affect decision-making processes. Client-politics, as defined by James Q. Wilson, 
refer to “a form of bilateral influence in which small and well-organized groups intensely interested 
in a policy develop close working relationships with those officials responsible for it.”157 Freeman 
explains that client politics are an element of considerable influence on the making of immigration 
policies. Public and popular opinions on migration are in general not organized or articulated well 
enough in order to influence the decision making process.158 Thus, only well articulated opinions 
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more powerfully affect decision-making process rather than scattered public opinion. Except for 
some “bad times”, when immigrants are targeted as scapegoats for worsening social conditions, dur-
ing “good times” migration policies are shaped by interest groups which benefit from migration ra-
ther than by public opinion, such as employers in labor-intensive industries. 
Client politics has differing effects on different social strata. There are winners, such as industrial 
employers, who reap benefits from policies facilitating foreign labor migration. In contrast, there are 
also losers, such as arguably migrants themselves, who are forced into insecure and exploitative 
jobs with little chance of promotion.159 For instance, fruit and vegetable growers in the Southern and 
Southwestern parts of the USA, the software and computer industry in the Northwest, or the con-
struction industry in Germany or Japan may be seen as the major benefiters from migrant labor 
force, what partly explains why many states have had temporary migration programs.160 The invita-
tion of “guest workers” to Germany was mainly driven by industrial lobbies with little discussion 
among politicians and the public.161 
However, sometimes the interests of certain stakeholders collide with those of opposing groups. 
During the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, opinions in Malaysia were divided over accept-
ing more migrant workers. The Malaysian Agricultural Producers Association, the construction in-
dustry and some state governments demanded more workers, while the Malaysian Trade Union 
Congress and Chinese political groups took the contrary position to protect domestic employment 
and wages for local workers or to safeguard the ethnic balance.162 
With regard to the movement of people under GATS Mode 4, Betts and Nicolaidis see the domestic 
conflict of interests as worrisome. The expected effects of the clause are less clear than in the cases 
of the movement of goods, services, or capital. Negative impacts might be aggravated by expected 
securitization of migration, so that Mode 4 potentially creates severe tensions in domestic poli-
tics.163 Introducing foreign labor force through the Mode 4 may thus lead to conflicts between pro-
spective winners and losers. 
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An important aspect in Japan’s migration policies is the understanding of “migration as a political 
instrument for foreign policy”164 or as a “bargaining chip.”165 Teitelbaum and Weiner have illustrat-
ed the intimate connection between international migration and foreign policy, and show that they 
reciprocally influence each other. From the economic push-pull perspective, sending countries pro-
mote migration strategically with the intention  
“to provide employment opportunities not available domestically, to satisfy career aspira-
tions that cannot be served at home, to reduce unsustainably high demographic increase or 
density, to secure remittances that provide foreign exchange and capital needed to finance 
trade deficits, to gain diplomatic leverage via overseas citizens’ political or economic influ-
ence in the destination country, and so on.”166  
Migration as a bargaining chip in diplomatic and trade negotiations extends to concrete economic 
strategies of many countries, which export workers systematically because of the large prospective 
benefits. They keep insisting on an access to the labor markets of OECD countries as part of their 
list of negotiation demands.167 
As another element of migration policies, correlations between international migration and humani-
tarian assistance have to be mentioned. One reason for concluding bilateral recruitment is the reduc-
tion of international migratory pressures, and sustainable policies are advocated to cure the root 
causes of international migration. These sustainable migration policies consist of foreign assistance, 
systems of trade incentives, and direct investment. These policies are supposes to accelerate the de-
velopment of countries of emigration by creating more domestic job opportunities.168 However, 
their effectiveness is questioned.169 The bilateral recruitment agreement between Germany and 
South Korea in 1963, for instance, developed out of humanitarian aid to help South Korea after the 
devastating Korean War (1950-1953). The plan’s purpose was to help South Korea’s backward min-
ing industry to improve through a transfer of German mining technology, and subsequently Korean 
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miners were sent to Germany.170 At the same time, Koreans migrants not only headed to Germany 
but also to the Gulf countries, Japan, and America to earn money. Foreign remittances became an 
invaluable source of foreign currency to the South Korean government, which enabled it to build 
strategic infrastructures to produce more export-oriented goods.171 Without going into too much de-
tail, the Korean example shows that to cure the root causes of North-South imbalances requires not 
only foreign aid but also strategic development plans. 
In this theoretical chapter I have described various discussions on migration rather than to focus on-
ly on a select theory because there is still little evidence how FTAs and EPAs containing the clause 
of movement of natural persons can enhance global migration governance. Nevertheless, necessary 
concepts such as the diversity of globalization, the securitization of migration, motivations of inter-
national migration, and governments’ use migration as a political tool have been well researched 
and discussed by a number of scholars. In this study I will use a combination of these concepts to 
analyze the effects of the migration and EPA nexus.  
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4.	  Elements	  making	  Japan’s	  migration	  policies	  
4.1	  Re-­‐making	  Japan’s	  closure	  to	  migration	  
On September 22nd 1986, the then Prime Minister Nakasone was criticized for his nationalist remark 
that the overall intelligence level of Japanese is on a higher level than that of the USA because eth-
nic minorities in the USA drive down the level of intelligence.172 His remark at once caused a scan-
dal in the USA and Japan, and on September 24th Nakasone felt obliged to clarify his statement in 
the following way: “What I was saying was that the United States made great achievements in the 
Apollo program and in the S.D.I., but there are things Americans have not been able to reach be-
cause of they include multiple nationalities. In contrast, things are easier in Japan because we are a 
homogeneous society.”173 It is astonishing that the Prime Minister corrected his remark on the level 
of intelligence by still insisting on the superiority of national homogeneity. 
His belief in Japan’s uniqueness and cultural and racial purity is an expression of a thinking exem-
plified in the nihonjinron (日本人論),174 which according to Befu, “encompasses virtually all as-
pects of Japanese culture in the broadest sense – from ‘race’ and cultural origins to social structure 
and psyche.”175 In short, nihonjinron aims to demonstrate the superiority of Japanese culture over 
other cultures and in this way is one of the fundamental pillars of Japanese nationalism.176 In ac-
cordance with his controversial remark, Nakasone’s migration policies in the 1980s were character-
ized by two features: the belief in the superiority of Japanese culture and the distrust of Western 
models of immigration. 
Distrust of the Western model, and in particular the German experience, can regularly be found in 
utterances by Japanese politicians as well as scholars.177 A basic similarity between Japan and Ger-
many is that German politicians, too, once strongly insisted that “Germany is not a country of im-
                                                
172 He said about it on September 22, 1986 during the National Workshop of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan 
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migration.”178 However, during the 1950s-1970s, Germany required additional workers for its 
booming economy. In this period, many foreign workers came to Germany through bilateral re-
cruitment agreements. Although originally the recruitment system was planned to be only temporary, 
a large part of the immigration finally turned out to be permanent as employers preferred to extend 
working contracts to save extra costs for recruiting and training.179 In spite of restrictions on family 
reunion, many migrant workers could manage to bring their families to Germany or find a German 
partner. As a result, the German government finally terminated the recruitment programs.180 
Alongside Gastarbeiter immigration, an increase in Asylum seekers and immigration from the for-
mer Soviet Union made the German population more diverse, at a time when the German reunifica-
tion created soaring economic and social burdens on the state. These developments gave rise to a 
growing public fear about social insecurity and instability, such an increasing rate of crime commit-
ted by “foreigners”, as well as sharp competition in the job market.181 This led to such extreme re-
sults as attacks on immigrants by right wing groups.182 A less tangible concern was that cultural and 
religious diversity might harm Germany’s “homogenous culture” and “national identity,” which led 
to an upswing of nationalist sentiment. Forsythe explains how stereotypization of Gastarbeiter 
helped to clarify a concept of “Germanness” as being clean and orderly. By comparing the daily 
lives of “the Germans” and the Gastarbeiter, foreignness was stigmatizes as dirty, dark, disorderly 
and fanatically religious.183 Although things have changed a lot since Forsythe published his study 
in 1989, complaints about foreigners as being a threat to social order, continue to appeal not only to 
extremists and radical conservatives. 
The Japanese government and scholars tend to perceive the settling-down of migrant workers in 
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Germany as negative. Firstly, their belongingness is raised as a concern. According to Shimada, 
Gastarbeiter remain outsiders. Their assimilation into the German society as “native Germans” is 
impossible because of cultural differences.184 Belonging nowhere – and everywhere –, they lead 
their lives separated and segregated from the German society.185 Tied to the issue of belongingness, 
loyalty and citizenship are discussed as problem areas. Secondly, the costs of providing education to 
migrants’ children, language courses, and social welfare,186 as Shimada points out, have accumulat-
ed to a social and economic burden for Germany.187 Thirdly, concerns about the social order and 
national security exist. Even though the number of foreigners in Japan is small, in 1988 the National 
Policy Agency established a special office to deal with crimes committed by foreigners.188 This im-
plies the fear that the arrival of more migrants, who are not intended by the government to come, 
will trigger a rise in more crime. 
Thus, the Gastarbeiter system is often mentioned by politicians and scholars as a negative model 
for Japan in considerations if Japan should accept more migrants. Consequently, Turkish migrants 
in Germany are discussed in political debates about migration189 as an example of policy failure as 
they have remained “foreign” to German culture and formed their own enclaves. Tanaka observes 
that in the Committee on Judicial Affairs of the Japanese parliament,190 a Japanese politician stated 
verbally that “Germany’s Gastarbeiter system has failed.”191 Furthermore, an international sympo-
sium, which was held in 1991 in Tokyo to discuss about German and Japanese experiences of mi-
gration, made clear the high degree interest on the side of the Japanese government in the German 
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integration policies and the impacts of Germany’s factual transformation into a country of immigra-
tion due to the Gastarbeiter.192  
To summarize, the Gastarbeiter experience contradicts the three tenets of immigration to which the 
Japanese government continues to stick. The comparison between Japan and Germany essentially 
serves to justify Japan’s closure to migration by exaggerating the negative results of temporary mi-
gration programs. 
4.2	  Globalization	  and	  Japan	  
Despite the efforts to learn from the German experience, it is clear that the Japanese government 
cannot control immigration as it pleases. As temporary migration programs seem too risky and long-
term immigration is off the table, not many options are left. On the other hand, not only does the 
Japanese economy demand an influx of labor, but also the international image of Japan is a factor to 
be considered, especially when the emphasis on the acceptance of immigration as part of Japan’s 
international contribution.193 The awareness that Japan is not alone in the world encourages and in-
spires the plan of Japan’s kokusaika. 
The efforts of kokusaika began with the ambitious project of raising to number of foreign students194 
in Japan to 100,000, which was initiated by Prime Minister Nakasone in May 1983. According to 
Tanaka, Nakasone’s decision was resulted from a meeting in Southeast Asia with old boys who had 
studied in Japan. “Nakasone was shocked about being given no answer when he asked the old boys 
whether they want to send their children to Japan for study.”195 Based on a proposal from the Minis-
ter of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the project’s goal was to reach 
100,000 foreign students by the 21st century.196 The project targeted mainly students from Southeast 
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Asia countries, who study abroad at their own expense, by granting them a so-called shuro (就労) 
visa – which included a work permit -, and simplifying the entry process.197 In 1986 already, a 
number of concerns were raised regarding the the shuro visa. Japan’s leading newspapers -Yomiuri 
and Asahi - reported that some of the foreign students abused the system to earn money. Instead of 
attending class, they spent most of their time working, and some even came to Japan on tourist visas 
and worked illegally with forged shuro visa. The students who only cam to work were started to be 
called Japayukisan (ジャパゆきさん),198 a term which originally indicated female migrants from the 
Philippines and Thailand working at bars and night clubs.199 This sudden increase of visa abuse was 
the result of the appreciation of the Japanese yen in 1985 after the Plaza currency accord, which 
made Japan into a more attractive destination for migration. 
However, it would be an exaggeration to conclude that most of the students come to Japan with the 
purpose to earn money. Considering the high living cost in Japan – especially for housing –, part-
time work is almost inevitable to survive. The legal working hours for students are 20 hours a week 
except on weekends and holidays. Arithmetically speaking, they can work up to 36 hours a week, if 
they work 8 hours on Saturdays and Sundays respectively, which almost accounts for a full-time job. 
Besides, considering other benefits of part-time jobs such improving one´s daily Japanese and get-
ting into contact with Japanese people, many foreign students consider a part-time job as positive 
and desirable. This is what scholars have referred to as the side-door which systematically produces 
working students. 
The plan of Japan’s kokusaika is based on the idea that Japan is relatively isolated in the era of 
globalization, if compared to other developed countries. This concept of kokusaika, which Befu de-
scribes as globalization from the West, is based on Western values and ideologies such as human-
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ism, human rights, equality, democracy and progress.200 Japanese media and politicians classify Ja-
pan as a developing country in terms of the number of foreign students, compared to other OECD 
countries such as France, the USA, and West Germany.201 This sort of inferiority complex origi-
nates from a Eurocentric point of view according to which Japan is comparable to the Western 
countries in terms of economic wealth, but still relatively underdeveloped with regard to the level of 
political awareness among the public, i. e. the weakness civil society. 
From this perspective of inferiority, many Japanese believe that a deeper international integration of 
Japan is only possible through the acceptance of more foreigners into the country and by making 
Japan into a more foreigner-friendly country. Considering the economic gap between Japan and 
countries in Southeast Asia, lifting the ban on foreign students to work was inevitable as the gov-
ernment could not afford to offer enough scholarships to attract more foreign students. Although the 
shuro visa is partly abused by some students and migration brokers, and negatively discussed in the 
media, it would be an overstatement to conclude that the Japanese government consciously intended 
the project from the beginning to solve labor shortages in the manufacturing and service sectors. 
How could Prime Minister Nakasone, who successfully played on Japan’s national identity through 
nihonjinron, combine the two ideas of a homogeneous Japan and Japan’s kokusaika? As a partial 
answer, Burgess indicates that having more foreigners does not necessarily mean a threat to Japan’s 
imagined homogeneity. By placing them into a stereotypical category, which classifies them as dif-
ferent from ordinary Japanese, foreigners remain excluded from positions of power, although they 
are recognized as part of Japanese society in the framework of Japan’s internationalization.202 This 
marginalization is exemplary for how the government still partly follows traditional identity policies 
of inclusion and exclusion of foreign subjects and how Japan maintains its closure while pursuing 
openness. Globalization is a core concept to grasp Japan’s seemingly contradictory and complex ac-
tions. On one hand Japan’s national identity has to be protected from the threat of globalization, and 
on the other hand, Japan wants to actively participate in the process of globalization in order to ob-
tain an advantageous position in the competitive global market and to spread a positive image of Ja-
pan to the world.  
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5.	  Trainees	  and	  the	  EPA	  Candidates	  
5.1	  The	  Technical	  Intern	  Training	  Program	  (TITP)	  
As a result of Japan’s economic boom in the 1980s, subcontractors of major automobile and electric 
industries required more workers, and the need was often filled with undocumented migrants, for-
eign students and trainees. Thinking about how to solve the shortage, controversial debates ensued 
among business leaders, politicians, and journalists about whether Japan had to import foreign labor 
to cope with the labor scarcity. Contradictory to the argument of the Japanese government that Ja-
pan could cope with rapid economic growth without reliance on migrant workers as it had done in 
the 1960s and the 1970s in contrast to a number of Western European countries, small- and medi-
um-sized companies in Japan pointed to acute labor shortages. The problem was partly solved 
through the trainee program that had started at the initiative of both government and private chan-
nels in the 1950s with the purpose to promote social and economic development in the sending 
countries. Most of the trainees come from China, Southeast Asia and South Korea.203 
Although from 1985 to the early 1990s the number of trainees accepted through both private and 
public channels increased threefold, some industries still suffered from stagnation due to the lack of 
labor force.204 In the discussions between politicians and business groups how to solve the shortage, 
to acceptance of less-skilled foreign labor was suggested. This caused a division of opinions into 
three: The first opinion argued for an “open country” (kaikoku; 開国), stating that Japan’s economy 
needed more low-skilled migrants to cope with the expanding international competition. The second 
opinion advocated a “closed country” (sakoku; 鎖国), insisting that opening the door to international 
migration was too dangerous and likely to lead to worsening salary levels and working conditions as 
well as social conflicts. The third opinion which was branded necessitarianism took a middle posi-
tion, conceding that it was not in Japan’s power to unilaterally stop the flow of international migra-
tion. This group emphasizes the need for migration policies based on humanitarian norms rather 
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than blindly accepting more migrants.205 
In the debate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) took a positive position out of the considera-
tion of forming friendly diplomatic relations with sending countries,206 while the Ministry of Labor 
was ambivalent because accepting trainees might on the one hand mitigate the labor scarcity, but on 
the other hand, it did not favor the idea that a reliance on foreign labor was the ultimate solution.207 
The Ministry of Justice was against more immigration and recommended to solve the labor shortage 
by recruiting dormant workforce within Japan by increasing per-capita and societal productivity.208 
Both Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the largest opposition party, the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), were also divided into special interest-based subgroups. With the support 
from the Ministry of Construction, various business representatives succeeded in voicing their inter-
ests to accept more foreign labor in a number of proposals.209 
As a result of this client politics, in 1989 the Immigration Control Act was revised to allow small- 
and medium size enterprises to receive a large number of trainees, in contrast to the previous 
framework which restricted the employment of trainees to multinational corporations and official 
agencies like the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Following the revision, the Japan Inter-
national Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO), which is in charge of the supervision and 
management of the trainees, was established in 1991, and the Technical Intern Training Program 
(TITP) was launched in April 1993. These were the most significant changes since the Immigration 
Control Act was revised in 1951, and the category of ‘trainee’ as a residential status was created in 
1981.210 
The three-year long technical intern training program consists of one year of acquiring skills with-
out payment and a two-year long practical experience to become more proficient in the acquired 
skills, under the same conditions as the Japanese co-workers regarding income and welfare bene-
fits.211 The trainees have to pass a National Trade Skills Test after the first year of their traineeship, 
which is based on the Human Resource Development Promotion Act approved by JITCO, in order 
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to proceed to the second phase. After the end of their three-year traineeship, trainees are supposed to 
return to their home countries. In short, trainees are cheap labor whom employers can hire at only 
two-thirds of the minimum wage (considering that the first year the trainees work for free). In addi-
tion, employers do not incur any responsibilities, if trainees do not pass the test. 
The program was systematically abused by certain employers due to a legal loophole concerning  
the first year of the traineeship. In 2009, the trainee program was revised in a way that placed the 
first year, too, under the labor-related laws and regulations.212 Before that, there was no legal protec-
tion for trainees during their first year against overtime working and other forms of exploitation be-
cause they were not recognized as employees.213  
Another problem which occurred is stigmatization of trainees. In 2013, there are a total of 68 occu-
pations and 127 types of work in the program, which include vegetable growing, crab and shrimp 
basket fishery, road rolling work, can seaming for canned foods etc.214 Although not all the occupa-
tions are categorized as so-called 3D jobs – dirty, dangerous and difficult (or 3K in Japanese: 
kitanai, kiken, and kitsui) –, many of them are related to the construction and manufacturing indus-
tries and thereby recognized as physical labor. In Japan as elsewhere, mental labor is implicitly val-
ued higher than physical in the hierarchy of occupations,215 out of which a sort of class structure can 
easily be derived. Their affiliation to the working class stigmatizes the trainees as inferior members 
of society. Filipinas, who for a long time have worked overwhelmingly as “entertainers”, have 
largely become synonymous with sex workers in Japan.216 Consequently, during the EPA negotia-
tions between Japan and the Philippines, some care facilities refrained refused to hire Filipina work-
ers because of this negative image associated with them.217 Similar kinds of categorization and ste-
reotypization are collectively attached to other immigrants from Southeast Asia and China. This 
kind of class structure creates ideal circumstances to exploit the little-protected trainees as it reduces 
the consciousness of immoral behavior and lowers the interest of society in the trainee’s fate. 
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Nevertheless, the most ironic element in the trainee program is the government’s propaganda. Hu-
manitarian actors and scholars criticize the purpose of the program, which officially states: 
“The Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) is a program where young workers from vari-
ous overseas countries acquire industrial and vocational skills as technical intern trainees at 
companies in Japan, and then improve their acquired skills through further two years technical 
intern training, so that they can utilize such skills for economic and industrial development af-
ter their return to home countries. In other words, the TITP aims to develop human resources 
who can contribute to the industrial development of foreign countries through transfer of Japa-
nese technology.”218  
 
This is in line with the slogan of Japan’s “international contribution”,219 which should at least partly 
be seen as a deceptive strategy to hide Japan’s labor shortage. 
These Japanese policies had for long been criticized by humanitarian actors because of abuse and 
exploitation which were made possible through trainee program,220 but only in 2009 did the Japa-
nese government reform the Immigration Act. Reform of the situation of foreigners in Japan had 
become a priority after the release of the Trafficking in Persons Report by the US Department of 
State. When on 14 June 2004, the Department of State released its annual report on human traffick-
ing, it placed Japan on the watch list due to Japan’s entertainer visa policy, which was open to fre-
quent abuse, especially for the purpose of sex trade. Such as no minimum wage and any kind of pro-
tection from the labor-related regulations, the lack of legal protection fosters a favorable environ-
ment to human traffickers and brokers subjecting the entertainers to debt bondage and coercion. 
These problems, although the report did not mention the trainee program directly, are exactly same 
to that the trainees have been experiencing. As the placement on the watch list was highly unusual 
for an OECD country it came as a shock for Japan. One year after the report, a governmental re-
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search on Japan’s trafficking problem was published which confirmed the American report’s find-
ings with respect to human trafficking cases in Japan.221 By that time, the MHLW and the Japan 
Business Federation (Keidanren) had already been calling for a reassessment of the trainee pro-
gram.222 But during 2004 to 2005 before the governmental research on human trafficking was done, 
research meetings on “Vocational Training Promotion” and its “Future Direction” had not touched 
upon the trainee problems seriously. Although in the twelve meetings which took place between 
2004 and 2005, the trainee problem was on the discussion agenda several times, the issue was not 
seriously discussed and no real efforts at reform of the trainee program were visible.223 
After the release of the government research paper, however, a decision which came out of a Cabi-
net Meeting in March 2006 on “propelling regulation innovation of future direction for legal protec-
tion on the trainees” as well as requests from the LDP to re-examine the trainee program led to the 
formation of a special research commission on the Technical Intern Training Program.224 The Hu-
man Resource Department Bureau of the MHLW organized a first research meeting in October 
2006. After 12 meetings in two years, the final report on the meetings announced which changes 
had to be made in order to protect trainees from exploitation and institutional abuse. It was decided 
that the first year of the traineeship, too, had to be protected by labor-related laws and regulations 
and that regulations on employers had to be tightened so that they could no longer abuse the pro-
gram. Furthermore, a possibility of additional two years of intensified training was opened for ex-
trainees who had returned to their home countries.225 
The final report makes clear that the aim of the changes is to improve poor working conditions, to 
protect trainees’ basic rights, and to prevent them from being utilized as low-wage workers.226 This 
implies that the government as well as politicians accepted that human rights violations had taken 
place and that trainees were indeed used as cheap labor during the 13 years of the existence of the 
program. In spite of this consciousness, the report did not question the slogan of Japan’s “interna-
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tional contribution” but rather reconfirmed the idea that Japan’s leadership is expected in Asia and 
that the traineeships were offered in answer to these expectations.227 The reform, in other word, was 
directly targeted toward the grievances mentioned in the U.S’s human trafficking report, and did 
nothing to tackle the prevalent attitude that Japan occupied a position of superiority in Asia, which 
should have been recognized as one of the pre-conditions of moral hazard and invisible exploitation 
mechanisms. In addition, the reform neither changed the trainees’ official status nor their three-year 
limited contract. 
The bottom-line is that the reforms did not address in any way the Japanese self-deception that the 
trainees do not to serve to solve Japan’s labor shortage although this was practically the case. The 
trainee program has been a de-facto temporary migration program given the fact that one million 
workers from China and Southeast Asia have entered Japan on trainee visas from 1992 to 2010.228 
As this feature of the program might well have been its primary purpose, no political will for reform 
was discernible until the appearance of external pressure in form of the criticism raised by the Unit-
ed States. 
In one Japanese discussion on the trainee program in 2004,229 the trainee program was even present-
ed to become a model for migration within the FTAs or EPAs. Considering that the start of EPA ne-
gotiations between the Philippines and Japan was in 2004, it is likely that a large number of aspects 
of the trainee program were consciously included into the basic framework of EPA migration. 
5.2	  Care	  Workers	  under	  the	  Economic	  Partnership	  Agreement	  
According to the original framework for the acceptance of care workers under the EPA,230 care mi-
grants enter Japan under the titles of “nurse candidate” (kangofu kohosha: 看護婦候補者) or “care-
worker candidate” (kaigo fukushi kohosha: 介護福祉士候補者). Similar to the trainee program, dur-
                                                
227 研修、機能実習制度は、２１世紀の国家社会、とりわけ、アジアにおいて指導的地位に立つことが期待される我が国
にとって益々重要な意義を持つ制度として..” In Report on Research Meetings on the Technical Intern Training 2008, 
p.23. 
228  Number of newly-entered Trainees and Technical Intern Trainees (i). JITCO (Access Date: 8.7.2013) 
http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/staticstics3.html. 
229 Record on the 2nd research meeting on Vocational Training Promotion and Future Direction. Record, Human 
Resource Department Bureau, MHLW, 2004. 
230 2010 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements - WTO, FTA/EPA, BIT – 2010, 
p.779.  
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ing their first 6 months in Japan, both categories of candidates receive Japanese language and 
nurse/care-worker training, after which they are dispatched to their contracted care facilities across 
the country. During the remaining time, nurse candidates practice their nursing knowledge and im-
prove their practical Japanese. If they pass the national nursing exam before their contracts expire, 
they become registered nurses and can continue to stay in Japan. As to care-worker candidates, they 
also do practical work and improve their knowledge of the Japanese care system after taking the 
same six-month orientation course. Unlike the nurse candidates, the care-worker candidates sign 
contracts for four years, and they, too, can remain in Japan when they pass the national care-worker 
exam.231 
When only a handful of the candidates actually passed the national exam,232 the original conception 
was severely criticized as unrealistic with respect to the stated goal of enabling the candidates to be-
come officially registered nurses and care-workers. Poor results in the exam are due to the language 
barrier and imbalances between working and studying time. The exams could only be sat in Japa-
nese, and it became clear that the candidates did not have enough time and resources to prepare 
while also being obliged to do their daily work. One enormous difficulty was that on the exam 
sheets Chinese characters (kanji) were not annotated with furigana – the Japanese syllabic alphabet 
which also serves as reading and pronunciation aid – so that many examinees were not able to un-
derstand the meanings of the kanji, although they might have known the words if they had been 
written in furigana or read out to them. Secondly, some of the subjects in the national nursing exam 
were different from what the candidates had had to learn in their home countries, so that even if the 
exam were in English, it would have required them to put a lot of time and effort into preparation.233 
Although some care facilities allocated time for the candidates to prepare for the exam, there was no 
official guideline for how the care facilities were supposed to train them. The candidates’ main oc-
cupations at their workplace were menial tasks such as helping to prepare meals and tidying up beds, 
as their employers were afraid that medical accidents might happen due to their insufficient 
knowledge of Japanese. As a consequence, the candidates became subject to deskilling and discour-
                                                
231 Ibid. 
232 In 2009, 152 Indonesians and 61 Filipino candidates took the exam, and 31 of them passed. In 2010 and 2011, the 
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agement.234 
Because of these obstacles most of the candidates left Japan after the expiration of their three- or 
four-year contracts. With regard to the candidates’ actual stay and the especially its temporal nature, 
one can detect systematic similarities between candidates and trainees. Even if they pass the nation-
al exam, their work permit can only be extended to up to 6 years,235 which is barely less than the 
time foreigners need to be eligible for permanent residence Japan, for which one can apply after 10 
years of legal residence in Japan. If they do not pass the exam, they are only left with three years of 
more or less valuable work experience and the money they have earned. 
Let us now have a look the negotiation process of the EPA program and how it has developed. After 
the failure of the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999, which revealed difficulties of pro-
moting multilateral free trade within the WTO framework, countries have started to actively pursue 
FTAs and EPAs in order to foster the development of regional markets. Japan realized that the 
growing importance of bilateral and regional economic (and even political) integration, as exempli-
fied in the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN, were signs of a global trend236 which left Japan in sort of a 
backward position.237 Especially consolidated and accelerated regional integration in East and 
Southeast Asia with China and South Korea as the leading actors238 became a motivation for Japan 
to vigorously strive for EPAs in order to secure Japan’s position in important markets.239 
In the negotiation processes between Japan and other countries the issue of migration caused divi-
sions and controversial discussions. Not only the Philippines, but also Thailand and Indonesia also 
demanded that their cooks, hotel staff, and care workers be included in the agreement.240 In this re-
gard, immigration to Japan became a bargaining chip to make the signing of an EPA with Japan 
seem more attractive to Southeast Asian countries, which had long demanded the inclusion of the 
                                                
234 Oh and Presly 2012. 
235 JICWELS 2013, p.22; heisei 20nen homusho kokucji dai 506 go (Notice 506). Notice, 1-16, Ministry of Justice p.8. 
236 2010 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements - WTO, FTA/EPA, BIT – 2010, 
p.661. 
237 Ibid., p.679. 
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movement of natural persons into the WTO norms. 
The EPA went in the direction of deregulating the movement of people instead of proceeding to-
ward labor market integration as was done in the EU. Therefore, negotiations on accepting the 
movement of natural persons lead to two questions: Who should be allowed to work in Japan and 
what kinds of resident and work permits have to be granted to them? Let us answer these questions 
by looking at the example of the negotiations between Japan and the Philippines.  
Two years after starting the negotiations, the JPEPA agreement was signed on 9 September 2006 by 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki during 
the Asia-Europe Meeting. In December 2006, the Japanese Diet approved the agreement, but the 
Philippine Senate delayed its early ratification due to what was claimed were some unconstitutional 
provisions in the agreement. Finally, the Filipino Senate ratified the agreement on 11 November 
2008, more than four years after the start of the negotiations. 
Among many controversial issues like fishery, toxic waste, tariffs etc., labor was the most divisive 
topic and was responsible for the long delay. When they came to the issue of Philippine care work-
ers, both sides haggled about the annual quota and the definition of who is a care worker, as the 
Philippines argued that nurses should be included in the agreement. Japan wanted to set the annual 
quota to only 200 and accept only care-workers, but due to severe opposition from the Philippines, 
which suspended the negotiations for a while,241 the limit was finally set to 1,000, consisting of 400 
nurses and 600 care-workers. However, in order to work in Japan as registered nurses and care-
workers, they were obliged to pass the national nursing exam and until then were only given the sta-
tus of “candidates”. For the first six months, they had to attend a Japanese language course, and dur-
ing the residual period, the candidates should improve and practice their nursing knowledge in a 
Japanese care facility.242 
This outline would soon be criticized. Even before the first dispatch of care workers, the chances 
that they could actually succeed in passing the Japanese national exam was put in question. Most of 
all, to pass the exam after three years of training seemed unrealistic, based on former passing rates 
                                                
241Labor issues to delay Japan-Philippines FTA. July 1, 2005. (Access Date: 17.7.2013). 
 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GG01Ae02.html. 
242 Japan to accept 1,000 Filipino nurses, caregivers under FTA. September 12, 2006. (Access Date: 17.7.2013). 
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of Philippine citizens in the exam, which were around 5 percent.243 Besides, application requirement 
were set very high. To be accepted in the program, applicants were required to make proof of a min-
imum of three years of job experience after obtaining their national nurse license, and care-worker 
candidates needed to have a college degree.  
Regarding the acceptance of foreign care workers, interests in Japan were divided into pro and con-
tra. Opponents argued that the introduction of foreign care workers would aggravate the current 
wage and working conditions of Japanese nurses and care-workers, and cause depression in the 
nursing labor market. Contrary to this, pro-EPA advocates highlighted the importance of interna-
tionalizing Japan’s nursing system and of Japan’s international contribution through the transfer of 
nursing technology.244 Professor Keiko Higuchi, a member of the advisory government panel on 
welfare, argued that Japan should try to improve the domestic care system before accepting foreign 
care workers, by, for example, encouraging the elderly to care of themselves or each other. Yukiko 
Okuma, a well-known author on nursing care for the elderly, saw the JIEPA and JPEPA only as su-
perficial solutions: “The EPA with Indonesia is a quick remedy for the labor system that faces the 
risk of lowering Japan’s nursing standards to accommodate more Asian nationals who are them-
selves not treated fairly under the scheme.’245 
One of most outspoken opponents was the Japanese Nursing Association (JNA), which is the largest 
nursing professional organization in Japan. It regarded the JPEPA simply as a means of solving the 
trade imbalance between the concerned countries by making human resources parts of export and 
import, not as a solution for the shortage of nurses in Japan. The JNA expressed worries about med-
ical accidents that might occur through miscommunication. Consequently, it insisted that foreign 
nurses had to pass the national nursing examination as Japanese nurses did, as well as obtain profi-
ciency in Japanese to provide safe nursing care. Therefore, the JNA categorically refused mutual 
recognition of nursing licenses.246 
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In contrast, the health care industry was overjoyed at the prospects of EPA migration. Hirohiko 
Nakamura, a member of the Upper House of the Diet and head of the Japanese Council of Senior 
Citizens Welfare Service, strongly advocated the introduction of foreign care workers in 2006. Be-
fore being elected to the Upper House in 2004, Nakamura worked as a businessman in the nursing-
care industry and operated 25 care facilities for senior citizens in the Tokushima Prefecture. He was 
part of a powerful interest group in support of the agreement and disposed of a considerable net-
work in the LDP.247 He made reference to the harshly competitive care market in Asia by stating: 
“If Japan keeps strict conditions, Filipino care workers may go to South Korea or China instead.”248 
Among the government organizations, the MOFA made a number of statements in favor of accept-
ing foreign care workers. In a report entitled “A mission toward Asia’s economic recovery” (Ajia 
keizai zaisei mishon) already in 1999, the MOFA expounded that foreign care workers will be con-
ducive to mitigate the lack of care workers in Japan.249 The Ministry of Justice, on the other hand, 
presented an ambiguous evaluation in 2000 and 2007, that the acceptance of foreign care workers 
required careful consideration as a mid- and long-term solution for the aging society.250 According 
to Takashi Yamasaki, who summarized the opinions of different government departments on the 
EPA in 2006, the cabinet meeting on June 4 2004251 and the MHLW252 emphasized that to accept 
care workers under the EPA was connected to the overall economic benefits from the EPA and was 
not motivated by a scarcity of care workers. In other words, accepting care workers was good for 
Japan because it was expected that Japan could reap a number of benefits for its automobile and 
other industries by conceding to accept foreign care workers. 
The EPA negotiations gave rise to a controversial discussion in sending countries as well. Major 
opponents within the Philippines argued that the EPA scheme was just another way of exploitation 
as was seen in Japanese trainee system before. Furthermore, sending nurses abroad worsened condi-
tions in domestic care sectors and might lead to deskilling of highly qualified Philippine nurses.253 
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Unlike the trainee program, which was a pulling and hauling between different ministries, the EPA 
negotiation took place on the state level and the major actor were the MOFA and the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The Ministry of Justice, which had been the major opponent 
to accept low-skilled migrants and the trainee program, even took a moderate position with regard 
to the EPA. 
5.3	  Reform	  of	  the	  EPAs	  
After care workers from Indonesia and the Philippines were accepted, the problem surfaced that 
care facilities became reluctant to hire them due to the financial burden that they entailed. The for-
eign care workers were guaranteed to work under the same conditions as their Japanese co-workers, 
but additionally the facilities were obligated to offer them accommodation, too, and proper training 
programs under the supervision of a person in charge (see table 1). According to Ogawa’s survey254 
on the motivations of care facilities to accept Indonesian care-workers, less than 5.3 percent of the 
facilities surveyed hired Indonesians in order to resolve shortages of labor. On the other hand, 42.1 
percent of care facilities answered that this was not a relevant motivation. Although in general those 
questioned facilities had positive impressions of the candidates in that the quality of their work was 
good and that they rendered the working climate more cheerful, attitudes on the program were very 
negative with regard to the increasing financial burden and workload for supervision and education. 
Thus, from the perspective of care facilities, the current economic burden exceeds expected benefits. 
Table	 1.	 The	 number	 of	 EPA	 candidates	 and	 accepting	 facilities	 
Year Status The Philippines Indonesia 
2008 
Nursing Candidates - 104 (47 facilities) 
Care-Worker Candidates - 104 (53 facilities) 
2009 
Nursing Candidates 93 (45 facilities) 173 (83 facilities) 
Care-Worker Candidates 190 (92 facilities) 189 (85 facilities) 
                                                
254 The Kyushu University Resarch Team conduced a survey of 19 care facilities that accepted the first batch of 
Indonesian candidates in 2010. The survey was asking about (1) Motives for Accepting Indonesian Certified Care-
Worker Candidates, (2) Positive Changes in the Workplace after Accepting Indonesian Candidates, (3) Negative 
Changes in the Workplace after Accepting Indonesian Candidates, (4) Level of Japanese Language at Workplace, (5) 
Assessment of the Indonesian Candidates, and (6) Recommendations Expressed by Care Facilities Employing 
Indonesian Candidates to EPA. Ogawa 2012.   
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2010 
Nursing Candidates 46 (27 facilities) 39 (19 facilities) 
Care-Worker Candidates 72 (34 facilities) 77 (34 facilities) 
2011 
Nursing Candidates 70 (36 facilities) 47 (22 facilities) 
Care-Worker Candidates 61 (33 facilities) 58 (29 facilities) 
2012 
Nursing Candidates 28 (16 facilities) 29 (15 facilities) 
Care-Worker Candidates 73 (35 facilities) 72 (32 facilities) 
2013 
Nursing Candidates 65 (31 facilities)* 48 (22 facilities)* 
Care-Worker Candidates 90 (38 facilities)* 109 (42 facilities)* 
Source.	 JICWELS 2013.	 p.7.	 
*	 pre-appointment	 
 
Along with the reluctance of care facilities to accept care workers, the low passing rate of the candi-
dates in the national nursing exam creates discontent and endangers the whole EPA program as 
many of the sending countries’ requests regarding migration had already been watered down during 
the negotiation. 
Therefore, Japanese government put a lot of effort in order to improve the situation by firstly tack-
ling the problem of proficiency in Japanese. Since 2012, nurse and care worker candidates have to 
take a six-month long Japanese language course before departing for Japan.255 For instance, the Ja-
pan Foundation offers the Preparatory Japanese Language Training (PJLT) at the Language Skills 
Institute of the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) in Taguig City in 
the Philippines under the Japanese government’s financial support.256 In addition, in 2012, the 
MHLW organized special examination meetings called the “National Nursing Exam for the EPA 
care worker candidates” (which does not include nursing candidates) in order to improve the poor 
passing rate. According to the report of the meetings on June 2012, the exam was envisaged to be 
changed to use easier terminology, including furigana, and to increase the overall time for the exam 
by 50 percent from 2012.257 In 2012 as well, the Japanese government and the Vietnamese govern-
ment launched a joint program in Vietnam to teach Japanese to care worker candidates. The candi-
dates are expected to come to Japan only after passing a Japanese language test which follows the 
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one-year long language program.258 
Another change is to improve conditions for care worker candidates in Japan. The MHLW decided 
to give the returned care-worker candidates one more chance to take the National Nursing Exam in 
2013,259 and on 26 February 2013, the cabinet decided to extend the EPA candidates’ residence and 
work permit by one year, considering that previous candidates who were not been offered a pre-
departure language course and were therefore at a disadvantage.260 Furthermore, the MHLW has 
given out a general guideline how to train the candidates which did not exist before, to change a sit-
uation which strained the care facilities financially and contributed to the low passing rate of the 
candidates in the national nursing exam. 
The efforts to reform EPA migration are impressive, especially in light of the frequent convening of 
research meetings and the immediate application of the changes, and compare favorably with the 
long intervals of reform in the trainee program. Nevertheless, changes were highly selective and a 
number of issues were not tackled: First, the candidate status remains unchanged and the require-
ments to apply for the EPA migration program remain the same. Second, deskilling of the candi-
dates was not addressed as a problem. The requirements of a college degree, one year of obligatory 
Japanese course, and three and a half years of traineeship for care worker candidates may just be a 
waste of human potential. The Japanese government seems to have no intention to lower the hurdle 
in general to accept more candidates, but only works toward increase the passing rate. If candidates 
jump all the huddles, then they are probably overqualified for their jobs, which are normally consid-
ered as semi- or low-skilled labor. In this way, the current EPA migration is likely to produce what 
the Japanese government considers as a desirable outcome: skilled migrants, temporality, and small 
numbers. 
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Apart from the element of external pressure, the different paces of reform in the EPA and the trainee 
program derive from differences in the political decision-making process as well as differences in 
the power of interest groups which are involved in the programs. Opinions among the ministries and 
the ministerial bureaucracies, which are crucial political decision-makers in Japan, are divided into 
pro, contra, and neutral and may swing according to the agendas. The interests of the Ministry of 
Justice and other ministries crash in the issue of opening the front door to less-skilled migrants. The 
Ministry of Justice has repeatedly confirmed its allegiance to the tenets of migration in the “Basic 
Plan for Immigration Control” which it publishes every five years. Due to the opposition from the 
Ministry of Justice, reform of the trainee program to become more liberal was difficult, unless there 
was an intervention by a higher political power, for example a strong will among high-ranking poli-
ticians toward reform. After in 2004 the US Department of State’s report on human trafficking had 
been released, the cabinet and politicians on higher levels in 2006 demanded changes in the trainee 
program, what lead to a vitalization of the previously stagnating discussion among ministries. An 
outline for reform was drafted within two years, after there had been no significant developments 
since 1993. In short, the bottom-up decision-making process and the lack of pressure from higher 
political authorities were the reasons why reforms occurred slowly and hesitatingly. 
Contrary to the trainee program, the EPA migration program is part of a larger framework including 
intellectual property, investment, energy, environment, and electronic commerce, i. e. areas Japan’s 
economic circles are very much interested in. When reforms of the EPA migration program were on 
the table, the main opposition was raised by the JNA, while the Ministry of Justice showed a more 
favorable attitude toward reform. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice drastically changed its former 
position of labeling globalization as a threat261 and emphasizing the importance Japan’s cultural 
homogeneity262, and instead announced that it would further on take an active role in facilitating 
foreigners’ entry into Japan, by explicitly referring to the importance of furthering Japan’s integra-
tion with rapidly growing Asian countries.263 This changing perspective of the Ministry of Justice 
and the institutionally weaker opposition group are an important element which enables the reform 
                                                
261 “Japan should seek prosperity and stability of people’s livelihood in a society more open to the international commu-
nity” in the introduction Justice, Basic Plan for Immigration Control Act (The 4th Edition) 2010. 
262 “However, if you trace back the history of Japanese society and give thought to the Japanese people's perception of 
society, culture and their sensitivity, it would not be realistic to suddenly introduce a large number of foreign labor. Ra-
ther, it is necessary for Japan to aim at maintaining the vitality of the socio-economy and enhancing tangible and intan-
gible affluence of social life by accepting foreigners in a way that would cause little friction with society.” Ibid. 
263 Justice, Basic Plan for Immigration Control Act (The 4th Edition) 2010, p.1, 3. 
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process in the EPA migratory framework. 
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6.	  Discussion	  
In the preceding chapters I have pointed to a number of similarities and differences between the 
trainee and EPA migration programs. One major difference emerged to be that in the case of the 
trainee program political negotiations to reform the program were delayed due to a bottom-up deci-
sion making process colliding interests between the ministries. In contrast, EPA migration has been 
reformed in a top-down process in which opposition can only arise through non-governmental ac-
tors, whose opposition is relatively less powerful than that of e. g. the Ministry of Justice in the 
trainee program. In spite of the different reform processes, actual reforms in the two programs were 
motivated not mainly by inside negotiation, but by external pressures such as the Human Traffick-
ing Report and the general EPA framework. However, unlike sporadically occurring external pres-
sure in the trainee program, the EPA exerts a continuous pressure to reform, the results of which are 
found in the minutes of various meetings and the speedy sequence of reforms. In this way, it is dif-
ferent kinds of external pressure which lead to varying paces of development in the EPA and the 
trainee program. 
One of the main research questions of this study was whether the inclusion of the clause of move-
ment of natural persons in the EPAs enables a healthier migration flow. Based on comparison be-
tween trainee and EPA migration into Japan, it can be concluded that at least exploitation and dis-
advantageous circumstance are improved faster and more easily if there exists powerful external 
pressure in the form of an international agreement. Keeping in mind that the trainee program has 
been abused for more than 15 years and only been reformed due to severe external criticism which 
damaged Japan’s image in the international society, it becomes obvious that the introduction of the 
clause in bi- and multilateral agreements will lead to healthier forms of migration. 
However, it is less clear that a healthier migration flow is desirable in economic terms. Some econ-
omists argue to include temporary migration in the WTO norms will guarantee transparent remit-
tance, a safe migratory journey, cheaper or no commission fee to migrate, and convenience to look 
for accommodation at the settling down step.264 From the macro perspective, the migration-trade 
linkage can be interpreted as facilitating North-South cooperation265 and a step toward a cost-
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efficient temporary migration circulation.266 Positive outcome like these are not yet visible in the 
case of Japan’s EPAs, which until now have produced a lot of costs to provide language courses 
while the circular migration did not really get in motion due to care workers’ difficulty to pass the 
Japanese national exam. On the other hand, talking about a healthier migration flow from the per-
spective of improving inhumane, unfair and exploitative working and living conditions, the quick 
occurrence and effectivity of reforms are a clear indicator for progress. With regard to this aspect, 
this study has proven the usefulness of including migration in bi- and multilateral agreements.  
As to the quality of reform, however, it is noteworthy that important issues such as deskilling, and 
high entry requirements have not been addressed at all. Whether the expansion of language training 
can really boost foreign candidates’ success rates in the Japanese national exams, is far from clear 
and remains to be seen in the future. 
From the sending countries’ perspective, another question is whether to inclusion of migration in the 
EPAs/FTAs proves to be beneficent in the long term because an increase in migration accelerates 
the brain drain, and industries in the sending countries might suffer in the end. A one-sided focus on 
migration in the negotiations could also weaken other negotiation positions and leave other trade 
and industrial sectors at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, if one considers that there are countries which 
are regularly accused that their immigration laws provide an institutionally favorable environment 
for systematic exploitation of migrant workers, like for example the kafala system in the Gulf 
states,267 including migration in the WTO norms and as a first step in bilateral agreements certainly 
gives more legitimate power to sending countries to press hosting countries to improve the status 
quo. 
The study has barely touched upon the individual level of participants in the EPA and trainee pro-
grams. One has to know, however, that care worker candidates are dispatched mostly to rural areas 
where the shortage of care workers is severe where most people are not familiar with encountering 
foreigners or non-Japanese. Further research is required to explore how the EPA care workers are 
perceived and treated in the rural areas and how this relates to what this study has exposed with re-
                                                
266 Dawson 2013. 
267 In the Gulf states, on the other hand, there is a kafala system giving employers opportunities to take “proper” actions 
to make it easy to control their hired worker. Employers easily confiscate migrant workers’ passport and abuse them 
because their employers are responsible for visa and legal status. 
Anh Nga Longva, “Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: The Kafala System in the Gulf.” Middle Eastern Report, Issue 
211 (1999): 20-22. 
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gard to the stigmatization and stereotypization of immigrants because of their occupation and their 
corresponding placement in the lower strata of the Japanese class structure. It seems that the Japa-
nese government is to a large part responsible for this as no efforts are made at micro-level multi-
cultural coexistence (tabunka kyosei: 多文化共生) or integration into the Japanese society in the 
both programs. This failure is presumably due to the intended temporary nature of the migrants’ so-
journ in the trainee program, but it is still extremely astonishing that there are not at least attempts to 
facilitate life in Japan for the EPA candidates who have the possibility to remain in Japan for a 
longer time. However, if there are visible efforts at integration they do not appear at the central gov-
ernment level but at the local level.268 
The lack of the central governmental interest implies that the permanent sojourn of foreigners is still 
seen as undesirable. This becomes clearer when we look at a recent change in policy on nikkeijin, i. 
e. foreign nationals of Japanese descent and mainly Japanese-Brazilians. The Japanese government 
has granted a special visa to nikkeijin to enter Japan since the late 1980s in order to solve shortages 
of labor.269 Nikkeijin were preferred to other migrants because they often already had ties to Japan 
and were assumed to fit more easily into the Japanese society.270 At the same time, Japan could ac-
cept a large number of immigrants and still continue to stick to its three tenets of migration and the 
illusion that Japan was not a country of immigration. Since 2008, however, many of nikkeijin have 
been laid off following to the economic downturn.271 In 2009, the Taro Aso cabinet established the 
Council for the Promotion of Measures for Foreign Residents whose job it was to deal with the soar-
ing unemployment rate of nikkeijin and their predicaments in raising their children and paying their 
rents. Simultaneously, the government introduced voluntary repatriation assistance with a ban on 
returning to Japan in the future on a long-term visa,272 a measure which had to be revised soon after 
                                                
268 The Japanese Constitution accords rights only to Japanese nationals and omits any mention of foreigners. However, 
in the Local Autonomy Law ensures the safety, health and welfare of the “residents”, foreign resident included. Roberts 
2012, p.57. 
269 “Nikkeijin are officially granted special status as ethnic Japanese and given a residence visa without limitations of job 
employment.” 
Robert Stuart Yoder, Deviance and Inequality in Japan: Japanese Youth and Foreign Migrants. The Policy Press, 2011, 
p.140. 
270 In 1988, it is estimated about 6,000 South American Nikkeijin registered in Japan, and the number increased to 
70,000 in 1990, 185,000 in 1992, and 200,000 in 1994. 
Goodman, Roger. "Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Migrants in Japan, and: Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: 
Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective (review)." The Journal of Japanese Studies 30, no. 2 
(2004), p. 465-467; Komai 2006, p,100. 
271 Roberts 2012. 
272 Coco Masters, Japan to Immigrants: Thanks, But You Can Go Home Now. April 20, 2009. (Access Date: 22.7.2013). 
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severe criticism.273 The Ministry of Justice then announced that it would try to restrict the further 
influx of nikkeijin and make the renewal of residence permits of children of nikkeijin contingent up-
on their school attendance,274 as there had been an increasing rate of crimes committed by the chil-
dren of nikkeijin, who mostly do not go to school.275 With regard to this, however, scholars and 
newspapers blamed the Japanese government for politicization of migrants as scapegoats. Japan’s 
basic Constitution only prescribes compulsory education for Japanese nationals so that the children 
of nikkeijin are not obliged to attend school. The children can attend a Japanese school on a volun-
tary basis or go to international schools, where tuition costs at least 2 million yen a year (approxi-
mately 20,000 US dollar 2013.07.24). As most nikkeijin are engaged in low-skilled and low-paid 
jobs, they can hardly afford this. Besides, for children who move to Japan between the age of 10 to 
15, it is difficult to attend a Japanese school due to the linguistic and educational differences. On the 
other hand, private Brazilian schools certified by Brazil’s Education Ministry have not been recog-
nized as official schools by the Japanese government.276 The high rate of school drop-outs277 and 
crime committed by the children of nikkeijin thus results from the lack of proper educational facili-
ties and the failure of the government to improve this situation. In short, when nikkeijin migration 
brought along the same problems which can be expected from other types of migration, recent gov-
ernment policy began to make them into scapegoats for increasing social problems, and their pres-
ence in Japan became less desirable. 
This case reconfirms that Japan’s three tenets of migration still serve as a powerful guideline in mi-
gration policy. Regardless of how many efforts the Japanese government puts into promoting Ja-
pan’s kokusaika and bringing more foreigners to Japan, benefits are granted only temporarily while 
certain problem areas are the systematically neglected. In this way, Japan’s kokusaika can coexist 
with Japan’s closure to migration because what Japan tries to achieve through kokusaika are an ad-
                                                                                                                                                            
 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892469,00.html. 
MHLW 2009. 
273 Roberts 2012, p.53. 
274 Basic Plan 2010, p.24. 
275 Yoder 2011, p.158. 
276 Hongo, Jun. Falling off the educational ladder: Brazilian schools have it all for students -- except accreditation. 
February 17, 2007. (Aceess Date: 23.7.2013). 
 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/02/17/national/falling-off-the-educational-ladder/#.Ue5mXhbq77V. 
Roberts 2012; Yoder 2011; Daniela de Carvlho, Migrants and Identity in Japan and Brazil: The Nikkeijin. 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
277 “a quarter of Nikkeijin children do not attend school, drop-out rates are high and most have less than a high-school 
education.” Yoder 2011, p.158. 
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vantageous position in the global economic competition and the attraction of global talent as non-
permanent residents. This non-permanent residency remains the plausible future of the EPA candi-
dates who, although they might end up to stay in Japan for a relatively long time, are not to be given 
the possibilty to become permanent members of the Japanese society. Consequentially, no discus-
sions on family reunification and support for the second generation take place among politicians. 
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7.	  Conclusion	  
The study has explored the Japanese government’s general attitudes toward migration. Except for 
high-skilled migrants, the government has long kept an extremely restrictive stance and held fast to 
the three tenets of no low-skilled immigrants, no permanent immigrants, and immigrants as a last 
resort. However, by time Japan has become more been dependent on foreign labor for certain sec-
tors which were difficult to be filled with domestic labor. As a response to this need, the Japanese 
government has been quite successful at tapping foreign labor sources without relying on a tempo-
rary recruitment system. Main sources have been foreign trainees mostly from countries in South-
east Asia as well as foreign students, nikkeijin, and undocumented migrants. 
While on one hand the government stuck to restrictive migration policies, it also realized that com-
pared with other OECD countries Japan lagged behind was in some ways lagging behind. In the ear-
ly 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone understood the existence of a global trend which stressed the 
importance of making one’s country into an attractive country for foreign students in the war for 
talent. Corresponding to this insight, Nakasone launched Japan’s kokusaika project in 1983 to reach 
the number of “100,000 foreign students in Japan by the 21st century” and subsequently regulations 
were reformed in order to attract more foreign students. As another step toward kokusaika, the gov-
ernment reformed the foreign trainee program in 1993, which had started in the 1950s as part of Ja-
pan’s ODA efforts, by allowing small and medium size companies to accept foreign trainees. The 
reform was conducted and encouraged under the pretext to help developing countries through a 
transfer of advanced Japanese technology and labeled as part of Japan’s international contribution. 
In the 21st century, Japan began to conclude a number of EPAs with countries mostly in Southeast 
Asia in order to secure more preferential trade conditions. By including the clause of movement of 
natural persons, the agreements contained the possibility of work and resident permits in Japan for 
foreign care workers. This constitutes a radical turn in Japan’s migration policy brought about by 
the desire to become more competitive in the global market. In short, kokusaika was Japan’s answer 
to the perceived challenge of globalization. 
Efforts at kokusaika stand in seeming contradiction to Japan’s closure to migration. The study has 
shown that these two aspects of Japanese migration policy are in fact compatible. First migration 
policies disguised as kokusaika allow only for the temporal residence of low-skilled foreigners. Se-
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cond, another invisible barrier exists to protect Japan’s “homogeneous community” from those for-
eigners who can stay relatively longer. The barrier has been psychologically and in part institution-
ally created through labor market segmentations, which cause long-term marginalization of certain 
groups through stereotypization and stigmatization of migrants’ typical occupations. A sort of dis-
crimination already exists in the labeling of EPA care workers as “candidates”, which implies their 
insufficient knowledge of the Japanese language and of Japanese skills and work ethics. In this 
manner, fundamental similarities exist between the EPA candidates and trainees. 
Trainee and EPA migration programs share a number of commonalities. First, as already pointed 
out, trainees and candidates are both sojourns. Second, both programs seemingly serve the purpose 
to provide opportunities to acquire familiarity with advanced Japanese technology, but candidates 
and trainees are often deskilled by menial tasks. Third, trainees and EPA candidates finally end up 
in the lower strata of Japanese class structure. Fourth, no genuine efforts by the Japanese govern-
ment are discernible at the integration of any of the groups into the Japanese society. In other words, 
there is no future-oriented discussion about permanent residence. 
This study also came across a number of significant differences between trainees and EPA candi-
dates. First, trainees are strictly limited to a traineeship period of up to three years, while EPA can-
didates can remain in Japan for up to six years additionally to their three- or four-year training, in 
case they pass the national nursing exam. Second, greater political controversy exists with respect to 
the trainees, while institutional reforms in the EPA migration program are much smoother. Thus, 
although the trainee program had since its relaunch in 1993, been criticized for permitting systemat-
ic exploitation of workers, a reform was undertaken only after 16 years as a result of external pres-
sure and worries about Japan’s reputation in the world community. The distinction between the two 
programs becomes manifest in the attitude of the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice as a 
powerful actor in Japan’s migration policy had traditionally taken a restrictive position toward ac-
cepting low-skilled migrants and strongly emphasized that the necessity of Japan’s international 
contribution through the trainee program was an exceptional case. In contrast, the voice of the min-
istry was milder and more favorable when it came to EPA candidates. This is because the EPA mi-
gration is part of a bigger framework and the decision-making process is more likely to be influ-
enced by high-ranking politicians, who are under pressure to perform due to the significant interests 
connected to the EPAs. Contrary to this, the trainee program is characterized by a bottom-up deci-
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sion-making process, which is responsible for the slow progress in attempts to reform because of the 
conflicting interests between concerned ministries. 
As to the question of trade-migration entanglement, in the Japanese case the linkage between trade 
and migration has positively influenced Japan into taking active steps to reform the flaws of the 
EPA program. This is an extraordinary result, considering that Japan had generally exhibited politi-
cal apathy and a restrictive attitude toward migration. The change does not go as far as to interfere 
with Japan’s fundamental tenets of migration, however, as the temporality of the migrants’ sojourn 
and their non-inclusion into Japanese society have not been touched by reform. 
In addition, the current EPA has not implemented the clause of movement of natural persons in full. 
A literal interpretation of the clause would postulate a regular temporary migratory circulation. 
However, Japan attached a condition to the temporary migration, i. e. success in the national nursing 
exam. If Japan really wants to implement the clause, the EPA migration program should not consist 
of a lengthy so-called training period but be directed toward regular occupation from the beginning. 
In other words, the sequence of reforms in the EPA program is less related to an implementation of 
the clause, but to the Japanese vision of migration. 
Thus, the trade-migration linkage does not seem to effectively influence Japan in changing her long-
term outlook on migration. Nevertheless, it has proven its usefulness in counteracting the occur-
rence of exploitation and human rights violations with respect to migrants, which before were fre-
quent. Global migration governance through the trade-migration entanglement could therefore pro-
vide minimum protections to migrants, although fundamental change in government’s attitude to-
ward migration seems unlikely. 
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